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El Huracán Katrina y la Educación Progresista

Nos hemos sentido profundamente conmovidos por la información de lo ocurrido en Louisiana y Mississipi las últimas semanas. Dado que nuestra organización y revista se centra en asuntos globales de justicia, igualdad social y económica, vemos la pobreza extrema como un asunto importante en el mundo en desarrollo. Las tristes escenas como aquellas de Nueva Orleans nos recuerdan del empobrecimiento y las dramáticas desigualdades en los países desarrollados. Como educadores críticos progresistas debemos tomar acciones y responsabilidades para educar y defender la gente en nuestra comunidad y en el mundo y para convertir la pobreza en historia. Tenemos también la esperanza que los educadores verán esta tragedia como un llamado a la acción para poner los asuntos de pobreza en la agenda de los países desarrollados y en desarrollo, de modo que nunca más nos hagamos la pregunta ¿como la vida puede ser puesta de lado en un mundo de abundancia?

Anuncios

Tenemos buenas noticias para compartir sobre nuestra asociación y nuestra revista. A nombre de los miembros del comité editorial, congratulamos a nuestro editor, Profesor Dr. Chen Xinren, en su promoción como profesor titular en la Universidad de Nanjing, China. El Prof. Chen es un académico reconocido con 12 libros y más de 40 artículos publicados, así como miembro de la Asociación Pragmatista China. Es un honor trabajar con el Dr. Xinren en la Asociación Internacional de Educadores y la Revista Internacional de Educación Progresista.

Por favor tomen en cuenta que la Revista Internacional de Educación Progresista (IJPE por sus siglas en inglés) está indexada en las siguientes tres grandes bases de datos y catálogos en línea que proporcionan servicios de búsqueda académica en línea a miles de bibliotecas en el mundo:

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Usted puede buscar y acceder a la información sobre la IJPE en estas bases de datos en línea.

Nuestro tercer anuncio es sobre la publicación de la Revista Internacional de Educación Progresista (IJPE). La Asociación Internacional de Educadores ha comenzado a publicar su revista en versión impresa. La suscripción anual, dentro de los EE.UU., es de 25$, por tres números. Si usted desea suscribirse a la versión impresa de la IJPE, por favor, envíe su pago de suscripción en cheque u orden monetaria (money order) a nombre de Mustafa KOC, a la siguiente dirección:
2108 S. Orchard Street #203
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El anuncio final es sobre una nueva revista. La Asociación Internacional de Educadores publicará una segunda revista interactiva, La Revista Turca de Análisis de Política Educativa e
**Investigación Estratégica** (EPASAD). La revista será publicada en el idioma Turco. El comité ejecutivo de la Asociación Internacional de Educadores ha concluido la búsqueda de los editores de esta revista. A nombre del comité damos la bienvenida a los nuevos editores de EPASAD: Prof. Dr. Haluk Soran, y Prof. Dra. Leyla Kucukahmet.


La Dr. Kucukahmet es profesora de Análisis de Políticas Educativas y Evaluación en la Universidad de Gazi en Turquía. Recibió su doctorado de la Universidad de Ankara, Turquía en 1976. Ella es una de los líderes académicas en el análisis de política educativa y evaluación en Turquía.

Mayor información sobre esta nueva revista y el comité editorial esta disponible en las siguientes direcciones:

http://inased.org/epasad/index.html
http://ilabs.inquiry.uiuc.edu/ilab/epasad

**El numero actual de IJPE**

En este tercer numero se publican tres artículos. En un artículo provocativo y crítico, “*Fuego y Polvo*”, el Dr. Peter McLaren, de la Universidad de California, Los Angeles, aborda temas políticos actuales de nuestro mundo y explora las futuras concepciones de pedagogía crítica a la luz del pensamiento de Paulo Freire.

En “*Las Dimensiones de la Reflexión: Un Análisis Conceptual y Contextual*”, la Dra. Susan Noffke, de la Universidad de Illinois y la Dra. Marie Brennan, de la Universidad de Australia del Sur, proporcionan una discusión cuidadosa sobre “la enseñanza reflexiva” y sobre ser “practicantes reflexivos”. No obstante que las autoras presentaron una versión preliminar de este trabajo en la Reunión Anual de la Asociación Americana de Investigación Educativa en abril de 1988, no tuvieron la oportunidad de publicar el mismo hasta ahora. Usted encontrara al final del artículo un postfacio indicando las razones por las cuales el mismo no fue publicado por este largo periodo de tiempo. Creemos que la reflexión sobre la trayectoria académica de las autoras en el postfacio puede ser considerado como una extraordinario ejemplo, una narrativa político-moral, de cómo se forman y crean vidas e identidades académicas. Es nuestra esperanza que los lectores encuentren tanto el artículo y el postfacio interesante y educativo.

En el tercer artículo “*Hacia una Pedagogía de la Investigación: Una Invitación*” El Dr. Fernando Galindo, de la Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Bolivia, describe las características de una cultura académica de consumo del conocimiento y la información y como esta impide el establecimiento de una cultura de producción del conocimiento en una institución de educación superior en Bolivia. Así mismo explora los contornos de un nuevo campo de reflexión e investigación en Bolivia, la pedagogía de la investigación, y extiende una invitación a profundizar la reflexión sobre la misma bosquejando una posible agenda de trabajo.
Como editores de la IJPE es nuestro deseo que gocen la lectura de estos artículos del presente número y los invitamos a submitir sus trabajos para el siguiente número de la IJPE.

Mustafa Yunus ERYAMAN                 Nihat Gurel KAHVECI
Managing Editor                     Assistant Managing Editor
Editorial Statement: Third Issue

Hurricane Katrina and Progressive Education

We have been deeply saddened by the news from Louisiana and Mississippi over the past few weeks. Since our organization and journal focus on global issues of justice, social and economic equality, we see extreme poverty as an important issue in the developing world. Sadly, scenes like those in New Orleans remind us of the impoverishment and dramatic inequalities that remain in the developed countries. We as critical and progressive educators need to take more action and responsibility to educate and advocate people in our community and in the world to make poverty history. We also hope that educators will see this tragedy as a call for positive action to put issues of poverty on the agenda of the developed and developing countries so that we are never again left asking how life could be left behind in a world of plenty.

Announcements

We have some good news to share about our association and journal. On behalf of the members of the editorial board, we congratulate our editor, Prof. Dr. Chen Xinren, on his promotion for a full professor appointment by the Nanjing University, China. Prof. Chen is a well-known academician with 12 books and more than 40 published articles. He is also a member of the standing committee of the China Pragmatics Association. It is an honor for us to work with Dr. Xinren in the International Association of Educators and International Journal of progressive Education.

Please note that the International Journal of Progressive Education (IJPE) is listed in the following three major online databases and catalogues which provide online academic search services to thousands of university libraries in the world:

1- WorldCat:  http://www.oclc.org/worldcat/default.htm
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3- Directory of Open Access Journals: (DOAJ):  http://www.doaj.org/home
4- EBSCO Publication:  http://www.ebsco.com

You can search and access to the info about the IJPE in these online databases.

Our third announcement is about the publication of the International Journal of Progressive Education (IJPE). The International Association of Educators has begun to publish our journal as a hard copy. A one year subscription (within the US) is $25 for three issues. If you wish to subscribe for the printed edition of IJPE, please send the subscription fee as check or money order (payable to Mustafa KOC) to the following address:

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The final announcement is about a new journal. The International Association of Educators will publish a second interactive journal, the Turkish Journal of Educational Policy Analysis and
Strategic Research (EPASAD). The journal will be published in Turkish. The executive committee of the International Association of Educators has ended the search for the editor positions of the journal. On behalf of the committee, we welcome the new editors of the EPASAD: Prof. Dr. Haluk Soran, and Prof. Dr. Leyla Kucukahmet.

Dr. Soran is the dean of the college of education at Hacettepe University in Turkey. He received his Ph.D. from Göttingen University, Germany in 1970. He has worked as the founding vice president at Harran University from 1998 to 2000. Dr. Kucukahmet is a professor of educational policy analysis and evaluation at Gazi University in Turkey. She received her Ph.D. from Ankara University, Turkey in 1976. She is a leading scholar of educational policy analysis and evaluation in Turkey. More information about the journal and editorial board is available at the following links:

http://inased.org/epasad/index.html
http://ilabs.inquiry.uiuc.edu/ilab/epasad

The Current Issue

In this third issue, three articles are being published. In his provocative and critical article, “Fire and Dust”, Dr. Peter McLaren, from University of California, Los Angeles, addresses the current political issues of our world, and explores the future conceptions of critical pedagogy in light of the Paul Freire’s thoughts.

In “The Dimensions of Reflection: A Conceptual and Contextual Analysis”, Dr. Susan Noffke, from the University of Illinois, and Dr. Marie Brennan, from the University of South Australia, provide thoughtful discussion about “reflective teaching” and being “reflective practitioners”. Although, the authors presented an earlier version of the paper at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, April, 1988, they did not have a chance to publish the paper till today. You will read a postscript about why the paper stayed as an “unpublished” conference paper for so long at the end of the article. We believe that the authors’ reflection on their academic journey with the paper in the postscript could be seen as an outstanding practical exemplar, a moral-political narrative of how to shape and create well-formed academic lives and identities. We hope you will find the article and postscript educative and interesting to read.

In the third article, “Towards a Research Pedagogy: An Invitation,” Dr. Fernando Galindo, from Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Bolivia, analyzes the features of a culture of knowledge, and information consumption, and how this practice impedes the establishment of a culture of knowledge production in a higher education institution in Bolivia. He also explores the contours of a new reflection and research field in Bolivia, the pedagogy of research, and extends an invitation to deepen the reflection outlining a possible working agenda about it.

As IJPE editors, we wish you enjoy reading the articles in this issue, and invite you to submit your invaluable works to the next issues of the IJPE.
Katrina Kasırgası ve Yenilikçi Eğitim


Duyurular

Sizleri Birliğiniz ve Dergimiz ile ilgili dört önemli gelişme konusunda bilgilendirmek isteriz. İlk gelişme, değerli editörüümüz Chen Xinren hakkındadır. Dr. Chen Xinren çalışmalar yaptığı Nanjing Üniversitesi tarafından göstermiş olduğu üstün akademik başarılardan dolayı Profesör olarak atanmış bulunmaktadır. Prof. Dr. Xinren kendi alanında 12 kitap ve 40 tan fazla akademik yayına sahip olan ve aynı zamanda Çin Pragmatik Birliği yönetim kurulu üyeliğini gövenini yürüten değerli bir akademisyendir. Dergimizin yayın kurulu üyeleri olarak kendisi ile beraber çalışmaktan onur duyduğunu belirtir, kendisine yeni görevinde başarılı dileriz.

İkinci duyurumuz dergimizin ulusalarası veri tabanları ve tarafları indekslerindeki durumu hakkındadır. Dergimiz, aşağıdaki isimleri ve internet adresleri belirtilen, ulusalarası düzeyde pek çok üniversiteye akademik tarama imkanı sağlayan indeksler ve veri tabanları tarafından sistemlerine dahil edilmişdir.

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3- Directory of Open Access Journals: (DOAJ):http://www.doaj.org/home
4- EBSCO Publication: http://www.ebsco.com

Dergimizin içeriği ve dergimizde yayımlanan makaleler hakkında geniş bilgilere yukarıda belirtilen taraflar indekslerinden de ulaşılabilir.

Üçüncü duyurumuz dergimizin basım ve yayını ile ilgili yeni gelişmeler hakkındadır. Yenilikçi Eğitim Dergisi Ağustos 2005 tarihinden itibaren elektronik olarak yayımlanmasını yansıra matbu olarak Uluslararası Eğitimciler Birliği tarafından basılmaya başlanmıştır. Dergimizin 1 yıllık ücreti Amerika Birleşik Devletleri için $25, diğer ülkeler için $35 olup dergimize abone olmak isteyenlerin abonelik ücretlerini Mustafa Koç
Son duyurumuz ise Uluslararası Eğitmciler Birliği tarafından yayınlanan “Eğitimde Politika Analizleri ve Stratejik Araştırmalar” dergisi hakkındadır. Türkçe olarak yayınlanacak olan derginin, Editör ve Yayın kurulu üyeliği seçimleri tamamlandı bulunmaktadır. Uluslararası Eğitmciler Birliği yönetim kurulu, derginin editörlüğünü, Prof. Dr. Haluk Soran ve Prof. Dr. Leyla Küçükahmet’in getirmiş bulunmaktadır.

Prof. Dr. Leyla Küçükahmet doktorasını 1976 yılında Ankara Üniversitesi’nde tamamlamış olup, halen Hacettepe Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dekanlığı görevini sürdürmektedir.

Dergi ile ilgili daha ayrıntılı bilgiye aşağıdaki internet adreslerinden ulaşabilirsiniz.

http://inased.org/epasad/index.html
http://ilabs.inquiry.uiuc.edu/ilab/epasad

Son Sayı

Dergimizin bu sayısında üç makale ve bir değerlendirme yazıısı bulunmaktadır. İlk makale son yıllarda eleştirel pedagoji alanında lider akademisyen olarak gösterilen California Üniversitesi’nden (UCLA) Prof. Dr. Peter McLaren tarafından kaleme alınmış “Ateş ve Toz” (Fire and Dust) adlı teorik çalışmasıdır. Bu çalışmada, Prof. Dr. McLaren güncel politik gelişmeler işığında eleştirel pedagojinin günümüzde ve gelecekte nasıl şekillenmesi gerektiğini incelmiştir.


IJPE Editörleri olarak sizlerden bu sayımda yayınlanan makaleler konusunda görüşlerinizi ve gelecek sayılarınıza katkılarınızı beklmektediz.

Saygılarımızla,

Mustafa Yunus ERYAMAN
Yönetici Editör

Nihat Gürel KAHVECİ
Yardımcı Yönetici Editör
HACIA UNA PEDAGOGÍA DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN: UNA INVITACIÓN

Dr. J. Fernando Galindo**
Universidad Mayor de San Simón

ABSTRACT
Tomando el caso de la educación en ciencias sociales y humanas en una institución de educación superior en Bolivia este ensayo explora como se inculca y reproduce una cultura del consumo de la información y del conocimiento, que obstruye la constitución de una cultura de producción del conocimiento. Luego de este diagnostico se plantea algunas ideas para superar esta cultura del consumo y comenzar a imaginar una cultura de la producción del conocimiento a través del método de la pedagogía de la investigación. Esta exploración se realiza desde la experiencia de un sociólogo formado tanto en el norte como el sur que actualmente trabaja con educación y tiene el propósito de contribuir a la agenda de construir una sociología reflexiva en la región.

PALABRAS CLAVES: producción y consumo de conocimiento, pedagogía de la investigación, Universidades-Bolivia

ABSTRACT
Based on the case of a higher education institution in Bolivia with programs in the social sciences and the humanities, this essay describes features of a culture of knowledge and information consumption and how this practice obstructs the establishment of a culture of knowledge production. Ideas for ways to overcome this knowledge-consuming culture and to imagine a knowledge-production culture through research pedagogy methods are suggested. This exploration stems from the experience of a sociologist currently working in education, whose purpose is to contribute to the agenda of building a reflexive sociology in Bolivia and the region.

Keywords: production and consumption of knowledge, research pedagogy, universities in Bolivia

Hacia una pedagogía de la investigación: una invitación*

Con una velocidad, facilidad y naturalidad casi innata en Bolivia vamos incorporando en nuestro léxico términos tales como sociedad de la información, sociedad del conocimiento y otros que quizás satisfacen nuestro deseo de sentirnos cosmopolitas y conectados con un mundo cada vez más globalizado. Los discursos políticos y académicos están plagados de este tipo de terminología. Y, a menudo estos términos se utilizan como punto de partida para contextualizar nuestros argumentos o como verdades para plantear soluciones a nuestros problemas.

Sin embargo, pocas veces nos preguntamos sobre lo que está detrás de estos términos, o sobre lo que los mismos implican para una sociedad y una historicidad local como la nuestra. Y cuando lo hacemos comienzan a surgir preguntas tales como: ¿Qué son las sociedades de la
información y el conocimiento? ¿Cuándo, cómo y dónde han surgido las mismas? ¿Es Bolivia una sociedad del conocimiento? ¿En qué grado o hasta qué punto son nuestras instituciones de educación superior (ES) andamiajes de la sociedad del conocimiento? Y ¿Por qué en contextos como las universidades nos apropiamos con tanta avidez de estos y otros discursos y los adoptamos como parte de nuestro sistema de verdades?

El presente ensayo persigue dos propósitos. Primero tomando el caso de la educación en ciencias sociales y humanas en la Universidad Mayor de San Simón (Cochabamba, Bolivia), explorar cómo se inculca y reproduce una cultura del consumo de la información y del conocimiento, que obstruye la constitución de una cultura de producción del conocimiento. Y segundo plantear algunas ideas para superar esta cultura del consumo y comenzar a imaginar una cultura de la producción del conocimiento a través del método de la pedagogía de la investigación. Esta exploración se realiza desde la experiencia de un sociólogo formado tanto en el norte como el sur que actualmente trabaja con educación y tiene el propósito de contribuir a la agenda de construir una sociología reflexiva en la región.

Este trabajo está dividido en cuatro partes. Se inicia con una descripción de algunas características de la cultura del consumo del conocimiento y la información en la Universidad Mayor de San Simón (UMSS) y las posibles causas que la explican. Luego se introduce la noción de pedagogía de la investigación y bosquejan algunas de sus características. En la tercera parte se describen elementos de la práctica de la pedagogía de la investigación, ilustrándola con tres ejemplos específicos. Finalmente, en las conclusiones, se plantean desafíos y tareas para el desarrollo de una pedagogía de la investigación y se extiende una invitación a profundizar la reflexión sobre este tema.

I. Consumiendo Conocimiento en la UMSS

¿Cuáles son algunas características del consumo del conocimiento y los obstáculos que impiden el desarrollo de una cultura de la producción del conocimiento en la UMSS? En esta sección exploro esta interrogante y planteo algunas provocaciones para iniciar el diálogo y la reflexión sobre la dialéctica producción-consumo del conocimiento.

En mi criterio varios factores explican la persistencia de una cultura del consumo del conocimiento en una institución de ES superior como la UMSS. Aquí brevemente me refiero a las siguientes: 1) la persistencia de un currículo escolástico-humanista, 2) la rígida estructura de los programas de estudio, 3) la reproducción de hábitos de estudio adquiridos en la escuela, 4) la tardía e incipiente institucionalización de la investigación en la universidad, 5) la falta de incentivo a la función académica de la Universidad, 6) la ausencia de una visión de “construcción social” del conocimiento, 7) el temor de dar nuestra versión de las cosas, y 8) nuestra relación conflictiva con la escritura. Esta descripción-diagnostico esta basada en mi experiencia de investigación y docencia tanto al nivel de grado y post-grado en diferentes unidades académicas de la Universidad de referencia. Como tal constituye una lectura personal y limitada del asunto en cuestión.
1) Persistencia de un currículo escolástico-humanista

Según mi criterio, ella (la universidad), en el fondo, no ha variado: habrá cambiado de organización, pero no ha cambiado de estructura.

(Carlos Medinaceli 1979:19)

A pesar de sus más de 150 años, de cambios organizacionales y la introducción de nuevas tecnologías de información en los procesos administrativos y académicos, en su centro, la UMSS sigue cargando las lógicas de su momento constitutivo. La UMSS se constituyó como universidad en 1832, siguiendo el modelo de universidad colonial organizado en facultades y con un currículo orientado a la formación de profesionales liberales, principalmente abogados y médicos, gestores de la cosa-publica y de los cuerpos. En términos de contenido, el currículo de estas primeras carreras, era fundamentalmente humanista, enciclopédico y escolástico. Humanista en el sentido de obviar el desarrollo de cualidades y habilidades técnicas; enciclopédico en la estructuración de contenidos que abarcaban un conjunto diverso y amplio de áreas de conocimiento flojamente acopladas e integradas; y escolástico en su método de enseñanza y aprendizaje, que privilegiaba la repetición y memorización en lugar de la creatividad, el análisis y la aplicación del conocimiento y la información recibida.

A pesar de los cambios en terminología, tecnología y organización, estas características perduran en los actuales planes de estudio de las diferentes carreras humanas y sociales, y funcionan como dispositivos pedagógico-organizativos subyacentes que dan coherencia al funcionamiento de las mismas. Por ejemplo, el plan de estudios de la carrera de sociología esta constituida por más de 50 asignaturas en áreas diversas como historia, antropología, economía, filosofía y sociología cuyos contenidos son raramente integrados o cuyos docentes raramente coordinan entre sí. La dimensión enciclopédica-escolástica también se reproduce al nivel de postgrado. Varios programas en docencia universitaria y educación superior se han estructurado bajo un modelo escolástico y dual que pone énfasis en el aprendizaje y consumo de contenidos, dejando el componente de investigación a la iniciativa estudiantil, brindando escaso o ningún apoyo institucional al mismo. Como consecuencia, estos programas tienen una baja eficacia terminal. Por ejemplo en las gestiones 2000-2003 un total de 125 personas se matricularon en los distintos programas de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, de los cuales 74 concluyeron con los planes de estudios y solo uno defendió su tesis (un 0.8% del total de estudiantes matriculados, o un 1.3% del total de estudiantes egresados) (Escalera 2004).

Este currículo humanista, enciclopédico y escolástica concentra los escasos recursos institucionales y el esfuerzo de los estudiantes en el consumo de contenidos e información y crea escasas oportunidades de aplicación del conocimiento y uso de la información, constituyéndose en un obstáculo al desarrollo de una cultura de la producción del conocimiento.

2) Rígida estructura disciplinar de los programas de estudio

Otro factor que refuerza la cultura académica consumista es la rígida estructura disciplinar de los programas de estudio. Esta estructura disciplinar se caracteriza por: 1) una rigidez en el número de objetos de conocimiento o la atención a un reducido número de dimensiones de un objeto de estudio y 2) una rigidez en la administración de las asignaturas de los programas de estudios. La primera característica está vinculada con los momentos constitutivos iniciales de las carreras o programas de estudio, que en su inicio se establecieron...
atendiendo a una determinada construcción social de las disciplinas y desarrollo de los objetos de estudio, los cuales se han constituido en una suerte de matriz inamovible que se reproduce por medio de las sagas disciplinarias, e impide su innovación. Por ejemplo la carrera de ciencias de la educación que se inicio a mediados de la década del 70 siguiendo los paradigmas y preocupaciones de ese momento, hasta la fecha no ha podido reestructurar o innovar su plan de estudios para incorporar demandas y preocupaciones emergentes de las últimas décadas (género, interculturalidad, educación indígena etc.) y nuevas concepciones de la disciplina y enfoques teóricos y metodológicos.

Por otro lado, debido a la estructura de administración de las asignaturas los docentes desarrollan un sentido de propiedad personal de las asignaturas y de su contenido. En las universidades publicas de Bolivia la cátedra titular (“tenure” en la tradición norteamericana) esta ligada a asignaturas y no a un determinado departamento, lo que hace difícil la innovación de los programas de estudio, puesto que cada catedrático titular o no titular defiende la permanencia de su materia ante cualquier intento de innovar un programa. Asimismo, una vez titularizados, los docentes se convierten en propietarios de las asignaturas y son los que regulan su grado de innovación o tradición. En la mayor parte de los casos, una vez que un docente ha establecido propiedad sobre una asignatura, no está interesado en actualizar la misma, ni sus metodologías de enseñanza. Y dado que los estudiantes están más interesados en aprobar las materias, tanto docentes como estudiantes tienden a reproducir la cultura del consumo de la tradición y la obsolencia, y a ver con cierto desdén actitudes, practicas e iniciativas tendientes a la innovación de contenidos y de dispositivos didácticos.

3) La reproducción hábitos de estudio adquiridos en la escuela

*La enseñanza de la literatura tal como he comprobado que se da en Bolivia—y yo mismo la doy—es un crimen de lesa cultura. No hay otro procedimiento que el abrumador del “dictado de cuadernos”.*

*Y ¿cómo se lo practica? El profesor dicta, dicta y dicta. Es un verdadero dictador (Carlos Medinaceli 1979: 83)*

Los estudiantes universitarios traen consigo el software escolástico con el cual fueron equipados en su formación escolar previa. En general, la educación primaria y secundaria, en nuestro medio, se caracteriza por la reproducción de las representaciones de la autoridad que emite el conocimiento, y por la repetición o performance del mismo. En la Universidad los estudiantes reproducen esta lógica de aprendizaje, basada en la reproducción de la autoridad del emisor (docente), entre otras cosas, debido a que fueron socializados en estas formas de aprendizaje y estudio, y a que la Universidad no ofrece otras alternativas de apropiación del conocimiento. En muy pocos departamentos o carreras se ofrecen clases o técnicas de estudio y aprendizaje que equipen a los estudiantes con herramientas para una apropiación crítica del conocimiento y un aprendizaje activo en la educación superior.

Y este estilo de aprendizaje que los estudiantes traen de su formación previa y la ausencia de alternativas de apropiación del conocimiento en la educación superior trae como consecuencia la domesticación de los estudiantes a formas tradicionales de pensamiento y
representa un obstáculo a su innovación y el desarrollo de la curiosidad y la imaginación, elementos claves de una cultura indagadora.

4) La tardía e incipiente institucionalización de la investigación en la UMSS

En cualquier institución de educación superior, la producción de conocimiento está directamente ligada con la fortaleza de su sector de investigación. En el caso de las universidades públicas de Bolivia, el área de investigación es todavía débil. Las universidades, no obstante contar con un número importante de centros de Investigación, 147 al año 2000, disponen de limitados recursos para el desarrollo de sus actividades, equivalentes al 5% de su presupuesto total (Lizarraga 2002: 239). A mediados de los 90s alrededor de 1000 personas estaban directamente o indirectamente ligadas con actividades de investigación. Las áreas con mayor apoyo eran agricultura, medicina e ingeniería que concentraban alrededor del 90% del presupuesto y las ciencias sociales y humanidades el restante 10%. (CEUB 1996:34).

El año 2002 se identificaron en la UMSS 34 unidades de investigación. De estas, más del 60% (23) estaban ligadas en su origen a convenios de cooperación internacional. El mismo año, 238 personas eran parte del personal regular de estas unidades con diferentes asignaciones de carga horaria. De estas, 15 personas poseían el título de doctorado (6%), 80 el título de maestría (34%) y el restante 60% el nivel de licenciatura y/o alguna especialidad. Entre 1998-2000 las unidades de investigación publicaron 191 artículos, es decir 0.4 artículos por investigador/año. El 57% de estos artículos fueron publicados en revistas de las propias unidades, de los cuales 87% en temáticas ligadas con ciencia, tecnología y agricultura. (UMSS 2000:10-28). Estos datos muestran una tardía y todavía incipiente institucionalización de la función de la investigación en la UMSS.

A diferencia de otros contextos académicos en la región, en Bolivia las universidades han incorporado tardíamente la investigación en su práctica institucional, aunque discursivamente reconocen la importancia de la investigación en sus documentos. Factores que en parte explican la tardía institucionalización de la investigación en la universidad son los siguientes: 1) la ausencia de recursos financieros, 2) una estructura universitaria orientada casi exclusivamente hacia las actividades de enseñanza-aprendizaje de contenidos, 3) la presencia de culturas académicas e institucionales para las cuales la investigación todavía aparece como una actividad exótica a la función universitaria, 4) la orientación social y política de las universidades opuestas a diferentes regímenes de gobierno y 5) las actitudes anti-intelectuales y anti-universitarias, mantenidas por gobiernos militares y democráticos respectivamente (Galindo 2003: 42-43). Esta tardía institucionalización ha retardado la conformación de comunidades de investigadores que contribuyan al desarrollo de hábitos y prácticas de investigación contextualizadas (locales), que luego puedan ser volcados en la docencia o en la extensión universitaria.

Esta tardía institucionalización, a su vez, está ligada al lugar que ocupa nuestro país en el contexto de la economía política de la producción, distribución y consumo del conocimiento y a nuestra condición de país neocolonial. Como país y como instituciones educativas de educación superior, nuestro lugar en la cadena del conocimiento no está en el polo de producción de la distribución del conocimiento, sino todavía en el polo de la recepción y el consumo del mismo.
5) Falta de incentivo a la función académica de la universidad

Las universidades son instituciones con objetivos múltiples y ambiguos (Baldridge 2001). A ellas se asignan objetivos diversos como investigación, docencia, extensión, transmisión de valores culturales, etc. Así mismo, al interior de las instituciones universitarias se construyen relaciones de jerarquías en sus funciones, es decir, implícita o explícitamente se establece un sistema de premios o incentivos de ciertas funciones y de menosprecio de otras. En el caso de la UMSS, existe un privilegio tácito de las funciones político-administrativas, más que de las funciones académicas, sea de docencia o de investigación. Y en la relación entre la función docente y de investigación los incentivos claramente se inclinan hacia la primera. En la UMSS se otorgan mejores sueldos y privilegios a aquellas personas en cargos políticos-administrativos que a aquellos en cargos académicos. Y la investigación ocupa el último escalón en la escala de incentivos económicos. Por hora de trabajo, los investigadores perciben una mitad de la remuneración recibido por los docentes. Debido a esta falta de incentivos de la función académica de la Universidad, el personal universitario busca su realización profesional y personal en el acceso a funciones político-administrativas, y no así en el desempeño de funciones académicas como la investigación. En la UMSS muchos docentes con nivel de doctorado desempeñan funciones político-administrativas, en lugar de actividades académicas, lo que contribuye al subdesarrollo de la función de investigación y debilita la formación de comunidades académicas. De continuar esta tendencia se corre el riesgo de institucionalizar un nuevo patrón de ineficiencia en el uso de los recursos humanos formados a un alto costo.

6) La ausencia de una visión de “construcción social” del conocimiento

En la UMSS, debido a la ausencia de comunidades académicas y la incipiente producción académica existente, se ha consolidado una visión exageradamente “realista” de la producción del conocimiento. Por un lado existe la creencia de que un trabajo de investigación agota las posibilidades de indagación sobre un tema. Asimismo, dada esta concepción realista del conocimiento y su producción no existe discusión sobre enfoques teóricos o metodológicos sobre un objeto de estudio. Finalmente existe una fuerte inclinación por grandes temas político-socialmente relevantes y ya legitimados por investigaciones previas o investigadores reconocidos, cancelando la posibilidad de construir objetos alternativos de estudio o ventanas alternativas de acercamiento y comprensión de nuestras realidades. A este nivel, cabe hacernos la pregunta relevante para qué y para quién?

En el fondo, lo que estas características expresan es que en la UMSS todavía no se ha desarrollado una visión de “construcción social del conocimiento” (Berger y Luckman 1979), o una visión de que el conocimiento es relativo y socialmente construido, respondiendo a propósitos e intereses subjetivos que son objetivados como resultado de la investigación, en función de la seriedad del proceso de investigación y la fortaleza de los resultados. Por otro lado, la ausencia de una visión de construcción social del conocimiento hace que no haya espacio para discusiones sobre enfoques, porque se asume que toda investigación legitimada es objetiva.
Una consecuencia de esta visión “realista” de la producción del conocimiento es que los resultados de investigación son vistos como monumentos a ser expuestos, en lugar de medios para ampliar o profundizar nuestro conocimiento y provocar la búsqueda de más conocimiento.

7. Temor de dar nuestra versión de las cosas

En la universidad y en nuestra cultura en general, hay cierta creencia que en los asuntos de la ciencia y el conocimiento ya todo está dicho por quienes son parte de los centros productores del conocimiento, y que nuestra tarea es apropiarnos y, en el mejor de los casos, adaptar ese conocimiento a nuestras circunstancias. Al respecto es ilustrativa la afirmación de un colega ingeniero a quien entreviste hace algunos años para quien “La investigación pura es solo para los países desarrollados que tienen recursos para eso. Nosotros tenemos que hacer investigación aplicada como hicieron los japoneses. Para que estar investigando si ya se sabe.”

En nuestro medio parece existir un miedo intrínseco de dar nuestra versión de las cosas, miedo que muy probablemente esté ligado con el hecho de que nuestras culturas han sido mantenidas en el silencio y la marginalidad, debido a nuestro pasado colonial. Y paradójicamente, cuando nuestras voces se expresan, no es en momentos constructivos, sino más bien en momentos destructivos o de autodefensa de la sociedad, lo que quizás explica que, como cultura, seamos poco propositivos.

Por otro lado también existe en la actualidad una actitud de rechazo a todo lo que viene de afuera en nombre de que no se adapta o no expresa nuestra realidad. Esto ha sido reforzado por actitudes “extremistas” de revalorización de lo local y lo propio desdeñando gran parte de lo que viene de fuera. En mi visión esta actitud tiene dos caras. En su lado negativo es un peligroso indicador de cerrarse hacia el otro y en su lado positivo, es un síntoma de intentar articular nuestra propia visión y versión de las cosas.

8. Relación conflictiva con la escritura

Finalmente debido a nuestro pasado colonial, hemos desarrollado una relación distante con el medio de expresión privilegiado de la cultura de producción del conocimiento, la escritura. Durante nuestro proceso de socialización escolar y universitaria, aprendemos a usar y expresar el código del otro, del que tiene el poder, y no así el código propio. Si bien nos hemos apropiado de la escritura, escribimos más para el otro, pero no para conectarnos con los demás, sino para sobrellevar la carga de su poder y aliviar nuestra propia condición de silencio. Tanto en la escuela como en la universidad escribimos no para expresar nuestras tensiones, búsquedas, descubrimientos, imaginación o intuición, sino para reproducir lo que el otro quiere escuchar. Por consiguiente, en la universidad confrontamos el enorme desafío de escribir para uno mismo, y en el proceso apropiarnos de nuestra voz para expresar nuestra experiencia.

Como respuesta a este desafío en los últimos años el autor ha introducido en la asignatura de sociología de la educación la escritura de diarios. En estos diarios los estudiantes se cuentan a sí mismos una historia de sus propios procesos educativos para comenzar a construir el itinerario educativo que los ha conducido a su situación presente. La escritura de diarios es un ejercicio de reflexividad para responder entre otras a preguntas tales como ¿por qué
hago lo que hago?, ¿Por que digo lo que digo?, ¿Por qué pienso lo que pienso? Y ¿por qué siento lo que siento?

Dentro de este contexto académico, institucional y disciplinario estructurado para consumir, ¿cómo estructurar condiciones y actitudes para el desarrollo de una cultura de la producción del conocimiento? En esta búsqueda de alternativas me gustaría explorar no aquellas ligadas con el establecimiento de políticas de investigación o la obtención y asignación de recursos o capacitación de recursos humanos, sino una alternativa más modesta, el trabajo sobre uno mismo a través de la practica de la pedagogía de la investigación. Esta alternativa, en mi visión, es una alternativa posible de ser implementada en las condiciones actuales de la universidad.

II. Hacia una pedagogía de la investigación

El tema de la pedagogía de la investigación es un asunto viejo y nuevo al mismo tiempo. En su vertiente más contemporánea surge de manera implícita en 1959 con la publicación del libro *La imaginación sociológica* de C. Wright Mills, que incluye un apéndice titulado *Sobre la artesanía intelectual*. En este apéndice Mills hace explícitos sus métodos personales de trabajo de cómo opera cuando realiza sus investigaciones. Este apéndice abre por primera vez, en el campo de las ciencias sociales, una ventana para explorar cómo operan los investigadores sociales en la práctica. Al mismo tiempo, basándose en su experiencia personal de investigación, el autor, sugiere un conjunto de herramientas para promover la imaginación sociológica o el proceso a través del cual el investigador construye su objeto de investigación, vinculando estructura social y biografía.

No obstante que Mills no acuña el término pedagogía de la investigación, el apéndice sobre su artesanía intelectual describe con detalle el carácter artesanal, practico y experiencial de lo que se podría denominar el campo de la pedagogía de la investigación. Al respecto, Mills plantea: "Únicamente mediante conversaciones en quién pensadores experimentados intercambien información acerca de su manera real de trabajar puede comunicarse al estudiante novel un concepto útil de método y de la teoría" (Mills 1977: 206).

El tema de la pedagogía de la investigación será posteriormente retomado por el sociólogo francés Pierre Bourdieu, quien, a inicios de la década del 70, centra gran parte de su reflexión en el establecimiento de formas de vigilancia epistemológica de su propia práctica de investigación. Bourdieu realiza dos abordajes del tema: 1) un abordaje teórico y 2) un abordaje práctico (teoría de la práctica). En el primer caso, a finales de los 60s, Bourdieu está más preocupado en las estrategias de control y de ruptura con el sentido común de los sociólogos y la construcción del objeto de estudio (Bourdieu, et al. 1984). Posteriormente durante los 70s y 80s Bourdieu profundizará sus ideas sobre este asunto y planteará la necesidad de construir teorías de la practica (Bourdieu 1977). Finalmente, a inicios de los 90s, perfilará con mayor precisión los contornos de una pedagogía de la investigación, en un ensayo titulado "La practica de la antropología reflexiva" (Bourdieu y Wacquaint 1995). En este trabajo, Bourdieu, prefigura los contornos del campo de la pedagogía de la investigación del siguiente modo:
La enseñanza de un oficio o, como diría Durkheim, de un "arte", entendido como "práctica pura sin teoría, exige una pedagogía que nada tiene que ver con la que se aplica a la enseñanza de conocimientos. Como puede observarse claramente en las sociedades carentes de escritura y escuelas -pero cabe señalar que esto también se aplica a lo que se transmite en las sociedades con escuelas, e incluso, en las escuelas mismas-, numerosos modos de pensamiento y de acción -a menudo mas vitales- se transmiten de la práctica a la práctica, mediante modos de transmisión totales y prácticos basados en el contacto directo y duradero entre quien enseña y quien aprende ("Haz lo mismo que yo"). Los historiadores y filósofos de las ciencias -y sobre todo los propios científicos- han observado con frecuencia que una parte muy importante del oficio de científicos se adquiere de acuerdo con modos de adquisición totalmente prácticos; el papel de la pedagogía del silencio, en la que se hace poco hincapié en la explicitación tanto de los esquemas transmitidos como de los esquemas que operan en la transmisión, es sin lugar a dudas tanto más importante en una ciencia cuanto que los contenidos, los conocimientos, modos de pensamiento y de acción son, ellos mismos, menos explícitos y menos codificados (Bourdieu 1995: 164)

El habitus científico es una regla encarnada o, mejor dicho, un modus operandi científico que funciona en la práctica conforme a las normas de la ciencia, pero sin partir de ellas. (Bourdieu 1995: 165)

La preocupación actual con la pedagogía de la investigación surge en el mundo anglosajón atada a la preocupación de cómo formar investigadores en el ámbito de doctorado. Por ejemplo, la Fundación Carnegie, en un documento titulado Principios para el cuidado de las disciplinas (2003), plantea una serie de lineamientos orientados al desarrollo de competencias de investigación de los futuros doctores (Ph.D.). Algunos de los principios planteados en este documento son los siguientes: 1) aquellos que tienen el grado de doctorado se constituyen en los “cuidadores y guías de sus disciplinas”, 2) en esencia, el grado de doctorado es un grado de investigación, 3) en sus disciplinas, aquellos que tienen el grado de doctorado deben ser capaces de evaluar, criticar y defender argumentos sobre conocimientos, 4) en sus disciplinas, aquellos que tienen doctorados deben saber discriminar entre qué ideas descartar y qué ideas mantener y 5) aquellos que tienen el grado de doctorado deben ser capaces de comunicar sus ideas, tanto a una audiencia académica, como no académica.

La pedagogía de la investigación es un término en búsqueda de objeto, y al presente es difícil ofrecer una caracterización cabal de la misma, sin describir casos concretos de la práctica de la pedagogía de la investigación, ejercicio que realizamos en el siguiente apartado. Una definición inicial de este campo de estudio es proporcionada por Bourdieu (1995: 186), para quien la pedagogía de la investigación se ocupa de transmitir instrumentos de construcción de la realidad y una disposición crítica, una inclinación a cuestionar dichos instrumentos.

Algunos elementos adicionales, planteados por este autor, para una posible caracterización de este campo son los siguientes:

1. Una preocupación por los modos de adquisición práctica, de modos de operar en la producción de conocimientos.
2. Una preocupación por las dimensiones no codificadas de la práctica de los investigadores de cómo operan realmente cuando realizan sus investigaciones y crean nuevo conocimiento.
3. Atención a las formas prácticas de transmisión de conocimiento tácito.
4. Formación de un habitus científico para la producción y búsqueda del conocimiento.
5. Atención al proceso de formación de la identidad de los investigadores.
6. Implica una relación entre quienes transmiten y quienes adquieren estas formas prácticas de construcción de conocimiento.

En síntesis, la pedagogía de la investigación abre un espacio de reflexión para explorar ¿cómo en la práctica se enseña y se aprende a investigar? Y esta pregunta puede ser respondida a varios niveles: 1) como una metapedagogía de la investigación que bosqueja grandes principios sobre cómo en la práctica enseñar y aprender a investigar, 2) como una pedagogía de la investigación de disciplinas particulares y 3) como una reflexión práctica de experiencias concretas de enseñanza y aprendizaje de la investigación. Considero que estos tres niveles también representan distintos acercamientos al tema, y, particularmente, me inclino por un enfoque que privilegia experiencias concretas. En el siguiente apartado, brevemente describo tres experiencias concretas de la práctica de la pedagogía de la investigación.

III. Prácticas de la pedagogía de la investigación

Al presente, una caracterización más clara y definida de los contornos de la pedagogía de la investigación, sólo puede emerger de la descripción de experiencias concretas de aplicación de la misma. En este apartado se describe tres modos concretos de la práctica de la pedagogía de la investigación: 1) la pedagogía de la investigación como una artesanía intelectual, 2) la pedagogía de la investigación como la transmisión de un oficio, y 3) la pedagogía de la investigación como acto reflexivo sobre la práctica de la investigación. Las primeras dos expresan las visiones de aquellos que transmiten el oficio de investigar y la ultima, la visión de un aprendiz de este oficio.

1) Pedagogía de la investigación como artesanía intelectual

Una pedagogía de la investigación como artesanía intelectual fue planteada en forma intuitiva por C. W. Mills a finales de la década del 50 como una reacción al supuesto objetivismo y universalismo de la sociología funcionalista. Mills plantea una concepción de la investigación como la práctica de un oficio artesanal, e inicia su apéndice sobre artesanía intelectual del siguiente modo:

Para el investigador social individual que se siente como parte de la tradición clásica, la ciencia social es la práctica de un oficio. En cuanto hombre que trabaja sobre problemas esenciales (sustantivos), figura entre los que rápidamente se impacientan y se cansan de discusiones complicadas sobre método-y-teoría en general, que interrumpen sus propios estudios. Cree que es mucho mejor la información de un estudioso activo acerca de cómo procede en su trabajo que una docena de "codificaciones de procedimiento" hechas por especialistas que quizás, no han realizado ningún trabajo de importancia. (Mills 1977: 206)
Algunos elementos de la pedagogía de la investigación, entendida como un proceso de artesanía intelectual, son los siguientes:

- La integración de la vida intelectual y de la experiencia cotidiana. A diferencia de Bourdieu, Mills plantea incorporar el sentido común en la investigación como parte del proceso de investigación, pero no como producto (Mills 1959: 196).
- La reconceptualización de la idea del método, entendida como la reflexión sobre maneras concretas de trabajar (Mills 1959: 195) o el desarrollo de hábitos reflexivos caracterizados por la confianza y el escepticismo (197).
- El uso de un diario como herramienta para el desarrollo de estos hábitos reflexivos y la definición y monitoreo de una agenda de investigación, que incluya el planteamiento de proyectos, la redacción de notas de lectura y el desarrollo de ideas e intuiciones.
- El desarrollo y la práctica de la imaginación sociológica entendida como la habilidad de cambiar de una perspectiva a otra y construir en el proceso una visión adecuada de la sociedad total y de sus componentes (estructura y biografía), a través de la combinación de ideas que nadie esperaba que fueran comparables. Mills plantea varios modos de estimular la imaginación sociológica, entre ellos: 1) la reorganización continua de los diarios, 2) el juego con frases y palabras, 3) la construcción de clasificaciones cruzadas, 4) la construcción de oposiciones, 5) la inversión del sentido de proporción del objeto bajo estudio, 6) la comparación de situaciones y 7) la distinción entre lo particular (tópicos = ideas) y lo general (temas = racionalidad, razón).
- La atención al proceso de escritura, distinguiendo entre la escritura simple y clara, en oposición a la pose académica. En la visión de Mills, una escritura complicada es expresión del deseo de superar la falta de estatus de la sociología en el mundo de las ciencias.
- La interrelación entre el contexto del descubrimiento y el contexto de la presentación (justificación) (Mills 1977: 222). Con esto Mills plantea implícitamente la necesidad de pensar la relación entre ambos contextos y no dejar de lado el primero, como una imposibilidad sobre la cual reflexionar, como planteó Popper.

2) Pedagogía de la investigación como la transmisión de un oficio

Esta idea está más claramente expresada en la práctica de investigación de Pierre Bourdieu, quien, a su modo, replica el ejercicio realizado por C. W. Mills en su apéndice sobre la artesanía intelectual.

Respecto a la enseñanza de la investigación como la transmisión de un oficio, Bourdieu indica lo siguiente:

Una de las funciones de un seminario como éste, es la de brindarles la oportunidad de observar cómo se efectúa realmente el trabajo de investigación. No dispondrán de una reseña integral de todos los tanteos, de todas las repeticiones que han sido necesarias para llegar al informe final que los anula. Pero, la película acelerada que les habré de presentar les permitirá hacerse una idea de lo que acontece en la intimidad de un taller, comparable al del artesano o del pintor del Quattrocento, con todos sus titubeos, atolladeros, renuncias, etc. Los investigadores más o menos avanzados presentan objetos que trataron de
construir y son sometidos a preguntas: así, a la manera de un viejo "compañero", como se dice en el lenguaje de los "oficios", intento abordar la experiencia obtenida con base en todos mis tanteos y errores pasados. (Bourdieu 1995: 162)

En la visión de Bourdieu, la pedagogía de la investigación está ligada a la transmisión del oficio de investigar, que se expresa más tangiblemente en el proceso de construcción de un objeto de estudio. Algunos procedimientos prácticos de construcción del objeto de estudio, propuestos por este autor, son los siguientes:

- Pensar un objeto de estudio en términos relacionales a través de la noción de campo, que permite acercarse al objeto como instancia de lo posible.
- La práctica de una reflexividad obsesiva que aplica una duda radical a las reglas del juego establecidas de investigar, así como a los propios supuestos (pre-nociones) del investigador.
- La transmisión de instrumentos de construcción de la realidad, que permitan simultáneamente procesos de ruptura con modos de pensamiento disciplinarios establecidos y de conversión hacia nuevos acercamientos (miradas) de la realidad.
- La objetivación y ruptura de las adherencias y adhesiones más profundas e inconscientes del investigador con su objeto de investigación.

3) Pedagogía de la investigación como acto reflexivo del proceso de investigación

Las visiones de la pedagogía de la investigación de Bourdieu y Mills están centradas del lado de quienes transmiten el oficio de investigar. En esta sección describo el proceso de aprendizaje del oficio de investigar, basado en mi experiencia personal de volverse un investigador (becoming a researcher), que ofrece algunos elementos para caracterizar una visión de la pedagogía de la investigación como acto reflexivo del proceso de aprender a investigar.

Esta reflexión se origina en la intersección de varios factores de los cuales menciono el siguiente para los propósitos de este ensayo: La necesidad de responder a una preocupación personal ligada con el proyecto de construcción del individuo en un contexto como Bolivia. En mi visión la construcción del individuo en Bolivia es todavía un proyecto abierto e inconcluso, y la reflexión sobre la práctica de la investigación podría brindar algunos elementos para hacer explícitas dimensiones de cómo nos volvemos personas, investigadores, o en términos mas generales, de cómo construimos nuestra identidad personal (que es múltiple y contradictoria). Entre otros, estas reflexiones me condujeron a distinguir entre tres nociones del “Yo”, el yo adscrito (“sabes con quien estás hablando”), el yo enrolado (“dime que quieres que haga”) y el yo reflexivo (capaz de pensarse contra si mismo), dándome esta ultima, una primera entrada para explorar los contornos de una sociología reflexiva.[3]

En mi acercamiento, es central la distinción o la tensión entre proceso y producto de investigación. Y para capturar las particularidades de estas dos dimensiones, apelé a la creación de espacios diferenciados de reflexión. Por un lado, para la reflexión del proceso de investigación, escribi un diario de investigación que denominé Biografía de la tesis doctoral, donde me cuento a mi mismo una historia de cómo procedí al realizar mi trabajo de investigación doctoral. Por otro lado, las diferentes versiones de los reportes de investigación de la tesis doctoral se constituyeron en registros del producto de investigación.
Algunas de las cosas que aprendí, como parte del proceso de volverme investigador, son las siguientes:

- Que cuando se realiza una investigación se trabaja por lo menos a dos niveles: 1) la producción de un reporte de investigación empírica sobre un asunto determinado y 2) la producción o artesanía intelectual del propio investigador. Si bien el primer nivel es aceptado y reconocido tácitamente por todo individuo involucrado en una investigación, la segunda dimensión queda generalmente impensada, dejando de lado la posibilidad de desarrollar las capacidades reflexivas del investigador de por qué hace lo que hace, dice lo que dice, piensa lo que piensa, investiga lo que investiga.

- La distinción entre escribir para otros y escribir para uno mismo. Por lo general, cuando uno escribe un reporte de investigación, lo hace pensando en una audiencia particular que evaluará, valorará o utilizará los resultados de una investigación. En este tipo de escritura, el investigador generalmente actúa (performance) su escritura para adecuarla a los cánones de lo académicamente aceptado, alienando, en el proceso su propia voz. Por otro lado, cuando se escribe para sí, se abre la posibilidad de apropiarse de nuestra voz y de afirmar nuestro proceso de artesanía intelectual. En mi visión, en un contexto cultural e institucional como el nuestro, caracterizado por una relación distante con la escritura, hay la necesidad de desarrollar estrategias y modos de escritura para uno mismo, como un proceso de autoafirmación y autoconocimiento, en lugar de reproducir ese hábito de relación distante y alienante con el lenguaje escrito.

- La distinción entre metodología como rendimiento (performance) y metodología como aprendizaje. La metodología como performance generalmente se expresa y reproduce en los capítulos metodológicos de los reportes de investigación, escritos para otros. Estos capítulos metodológicos, por lo general, son apócrifos a la investigación que se reporta, porque no expresan cómo en realidad se llevó a cabo la investigación, sino se limitan a inventariar procedimientos metodológicos codificados y legitimados en cierta disciplina, y, principalmente, aquellos que están en boga. Pero, en estas descripciones metodológicas, muy pocas veces se reportan los fracasos, los caminos equivocados, los cambios de dirección, los errores de la investigación, aspectos que hacen verdaderamente a una investigación empírica. Al registro de estos errores y fracasos es lo que denomino metodología como aprendizaje. Por su énfasis en una metodología libre de errores y exitosa, la investigación basada en una concepción de metodología como actuación (performance) expresa una visión apolinea (forma perfecta) de la investigación. En contraposición a esta concepción lineal planteo una visión dionísica (forma imperfecta, nómadamente, siempre en movimiento) de la investigación, que provee un registro más cercano y fidedigno de la complejidad del proceso de construcción del conocimiento social.

- Finalmente, otra herramienta que aprendí al volverme investigador es a dudar de mis propios conocimientos y certezas. En esto, creo yo, radica una diferencia fundamental entre el nivel del postgrado y el pregrado. En el pregrado los estudiantes están inmersos en un proceso de adquisición de códigos lingüísticos correspondientes a las disciplinas respectivas en las que se forman, y en un proceso de apropiación de los mismos para ganarse el derecho de ejercer su oficio. En este sentido, la educación de pregrado está orientada principalmente a la adquisición de hábitos científicos de consumo del conocimiento y de la información. Por otro lado, considero que una de las competencias
o habilidades que brinda el postgrado es el desarrollo de la capacidad de dudar de las propias certezas, abriendo la posibilidad para la creación de nuevo conocimiento, contribuyendo así a la generación de valores que sustenten una cultura de la producción del conocimiento.

Dentro del conjunto de estas tensiones, mi propuesta es asumir las mismas como parte de la naturaleza paradójica de la producción del conocimiento. Es decir, por un lado, se plantea la necesidad de cuestionar el modo supuestamente científico de hacer investigación, combinándolo con modos menos convencionales de producción de conocimiento.

IV. Tareas y desafíos de la pedagogía de la investigación: una invitación

¿Cómo desarrollar una cultura de la investigación en contextos académicos como los nuestros? Y Cual es el rol de la practica de la pedagogía de la investigación en este desafío?

La respuesta a la primera pregunta es compleja y tiene varios pliegues ligados con la formación de recursos humanos para la investigación, el establecimiento de políticas de apoyo financiero a las actividades de investigación y el incentivo a la función de investigación; todas ellas tareas importantes en el proceso de crear una cultura de la investigación en las universidades. Sin embargo estas opciones demandan la inversión de recursos económicos sean externos e internos y la participación de actores en la actualidad no directamente ligados o interesados con procesos de investigación (estado, administradores, etc). La propuesta de la practica de la pedagogía de la investigación es una propuesta que envuelve a aquellos directamente involucrados en investigación y la enseñanza de la investigación en las condiciones actuales de las universidades. Por tanto mas que trabajar en la generación de condiciones institucionales, financieras, humanas no disponibles al presente apunta mas a trabajar con lo que se tiene a disposición, para generar una cultura de la producción del conocimiento. Sin embargo dado que la pedagogía de la investigación es un campo emergente y todavía no bien definido me gustaría plantear a manera de invitación algunos elementos de una posible agenda de trabajo sobre la misma. Y cuya respuesta considero puede dar algunas pistas para imaginar una cultura de la producción del conocimiento en las áreas de las ciencias sociales y humanidades.

La creación de una pedagogía de la investigación es parte del proyecto de reconstrucción de unas ciencias sociales y humanas más reflexivas en la región, una sociología reflexiva, una pedagogía reflexiva, una historia reflexiva, una ciencia política reflexiva, etc. Y en este proyecto existen varias itinerarios a seguir, 1) un acercamiento y apropiación crítica de las presentes discusiones sobre reflexividad, 2) una indagación de las bases reflexivas históricas, culturales y académicas presentes en nuestro medio y 3) una reflexión sobre nuestras propias experiencias de investigación.

Apropiación crítica de la discusión presente sobre reflexividad

El asunto de la reflexividad es un tema que va cobrado carta de ciudadanía en la academia del norte desde hace aproximadamente dos décadas, aunque el mismo ya estaba presente con anterioridad en el trabajo de autores como C. W. Mills, Alvin Gouldner, y Pierre...
Bourdieu. El interés presente en este tema sin embargo es más polémico que practico. Y las discusiones se han polarizado entre aquellos que apoyan y los que critican la reflexividad, entre aquellos que consideran que la reflexividad añade valor agregado a la practica de la investigación y aquellos que no reconocen ningún valor agregado. En este sentido, la reflexividad se ha convertido en un recurso mas en las estrategias de posicionamiento y acumulación de capital simbólico de los académicos en el campo intelectual.

No obstante que esta discusión presente sobre el tema proporciona interesantes entradas para explorar la relación entre biografía y la producción de conocimiento/verdad, considero que una agenda reflexiva en la región podría beneficiarse mas de una apropiación crítica de aquellas versiones de reflexividad basadas en la practica de la misma. En esta línea se ubican los trabajos de los clásicos de la reflexividad como C. W. Mills, Alvin Gouldner y Pierre Bourdieu. Otros recursos importantes son por ejemplo el volumen compilado por P. Hammond (1964) que discute la interacción entre los aspectos racionales y no racionales de la investigación social, Shulamit Reinharz (1979) que lidia con el asunto de la socialización profesional y la búsqueda de metodologías de investigación alternativa basadas en la experiencia, y el volumen editado por Pamela Moss (2001) que reúne las reflexiones de un grupo de geógrafos y su proceso de volverse académicos a través de la investigación empírica.

Para aquellos que tuvimos una formación académica en la intersección norte-sur, creo tambien importante una recuperación crítica de la tradición post-colonial. La que no obstante focalizar su reflexión en el sur es realizada desde el norte. Y en asuntos de reflexividad definitivamente la ubicación y el contexto desde donde se realiza la misma son cruciales. No es lo mismo reflexionar sobre el sur y la practica de investigación desde la comodidad de la vida académica del norte, que desde los ajetreos por sobrevivir como académico en el sur. Finalmente considero que la epistemología feminista y la tesis de que lo “subjetivo es político” podrían brindar una ventana para reflexionar sobre las trayectorias académicas en la región.

Indagación de las bases históricas, culturales y académicas reflexivas en nuestro medio

Otro elemento en la construcción de una pedagogía de la investigación es la indagación de las bases reflexivas históricas, culturales y académicas presentes en nuestro medio. Es decir, ¿de qué elementos y antecedentes reflexivos contamos en nuestra cultura (andina u otra) y tradición intelectual local y regional que fundamenten un proyecto reflexivo de conocimiento? Por ejemplo, en el caso de C. W. Mills (1959) las bases de su sociología reflexiva provienen de su compromiso con los valores pragmatistas de la sociedad estadounidense, secularización y especialización, o de la fusión entre la “cabeza”, “lo artesanal” y el “intelecto” (Horowitz 1983: 132). Así como de la recuperación de la practica de “auto-examinación” del puritanismo norteamericano. O en el caso de la sociología de Bourdieu (2000) una de cuyas bases reflexivas proviene de su crítica de la actitud académica escolástica proveniente del dominio de la filosofía en el campo intelectual francés hasta la década del 60. En el caso de Bolivia ¿en qué elementos de nuestra cultura andina o moderna, religión cristiana, andina u otra y tradición académica puede fundamentarse un proyecto reflexivo de conocimiento? Ciertamente las respuestas a esta pregunta darán una consistencia fundamental a nuestras reflexividades locales y evitaran que este proyecto se convierta en una caja de resonancia de las agendas académicas del norte.
Reflexión sobre nuestras prácticas y experiencias de investigación

La investigación social no se desarrolla de manera lineal como se prescribe en los manuales de teorías, métodos y técnicas de investigación social. Este es un proceso más rico, hecho de errores y aciertos, atolladeros y salidas inciertas, inicios y re-inicios, de satisfacciones y frustraciones.

En este proceso las lógicas de investigación prescritas en los manuales son poco útiles e inclusive inútiles. Esto debido a que las mismas son construcciones sociales planteadas en ciertos contextos y condiciones específicas y respondiendo a determinadas estrategias de posicionamiento de sus autores en la dinámica de determinados campos intelectuales. Por la magia del proceso de institucionalización y difusión de ciertas formas de hacer ciencia, las mismas se convierten en tecnologías que reproducen y difunden formas y procedimientos localizados de producir conocimiento como si fueran cánones universales.

Afortunadamente cada vez hay un mayor reconocimiento de la pluralidad de contextos y formas de producción de conocimientos. No obstante que ya existe una larga e importante tradición de reflexión sobre la naturaleza local del ¿Qué?, ¿Para que?, y ¿por quien? de la producción del conocimiento social, todavía existe un vacío en el ¿cómo? de la producción de conocimiento localizado.

El cómo, o la metodología localizada de la producción del conocimiento tiene múltiples dimensiones que se sobrepone con las preguntas previas. Una dimensión particular se refiere a aquellos procedimientos, formas de acción y pensamiento tácito, inscritos en las lógicas practicas del quehacer investigativo, al que los investigadores en acción apelan cuando realizan investigación. En la práctica concreta de la investigación, los investigadores hacen uso de herramientas pre-reflexivas, encarnadas en su propia biografía, socialización en una disciplina y aprendizaje como investigadores, más que en procedimientos estandarizados canonizados en los manuales de investigación social. Los últimos cumplen más la función de legitimación, ante una audiencia específica (una comunidad de investigadores, etc.) de aquellas herramientas y procedimientos subjetivos y encarnados con los cuales realmente opera el investigador. Y una tarea de la practica de la pedagogía de la investigación es precisamente el explorar los vínculos y tensiones entre estos procedimientos metodológicos tácitos, prácticos y pre-reflexivos, y los procedimientos canonizados y legitimados en los manuales y en las disciplinas.

La pedagogía de la investigación es una invitación a desarrollar una sensibilidad y cuidado de nuestras herramientas de pensamiento y acción en la practica de la investigación y la enseñanza de la investigación. Una invitación a explorar la intimidad, e intentar hacer explícitas esas gramáticas estratégicas (siempre móviles) que guían nuestras formas de pensar y actuar cuando estamos insertos en procesos de producción de conocimiento. Explicitarlas no solo para tener un registro de las mismas, sino para reflexivamente intentar hacer un uso de ellas.

En mi opinión algunos desafíos en el proceso de construir el campo de la pedagogía de la investigación son los siguientes:
Exploran las relaciones y tensiones entre los procedimientos canonizados y los procedimientos prácticos de investigación en un contexto post-colonial.

Explorar las prácticas de la pedagogía de la investigación de autores específicos. En el contexto latinoamericano por ejemplo los trabajos de Wainerman y Sautu (2001) y Sarlé (2004)

Escribir diarios o “biografías” de investigación (Galindo 2001, 2004) como parte intrínseca de la practica de la investigación, que permitan comprender nuestros procesos personales de volverse investigadores y como un intento de hacer registro de nuestra “epistemología interior” y sus herramientas.

En el ámbito de la enseñanza de la investigación, un modo de ir creando espacio para el desarrollo de la investigación es centrar el aprendizaje no sólo en el discurso del método, o la enseñanza de los procedimientos canonizados en la literatura, sino fundamentalmente en la practicas de investigación. En esta línea también es importante crear espacios de intercambio y reflexión entre investigadores locales, donde puedan compartir experiencias personales de volverse investigadores, y los "trucos y mañas de su oficio de investigar"; es decir, aquellos procedimientos prácticos que no se encuentran codificados en los libros sobre teoría y metodologia de la investigación, sino encarnados en su propia práctica de investigación.

Finalmente hay una urgente necesidad de motivar, a todos aquellos involucrados en procesos de investigación, a reflexionar sobre sus prácticas de investigación, así como exigir, a los estudiantes que escriben tesis, a incluir en sus reportes de investigación reflexiones sobre lo que aprendieron del proceso de realizar sus investigaciones.
REFERENCIAS


Notes

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A diferencia de otros contextos donde el nivel de postgrado se estructura con el propósito de fortalecer una cultura académica local propia, en el caso de las Universidades Bolivianas se estructura en gran parte para dar respuesta a la deuda histórica de las universidades con sectores de la población que no pudieron acceder a este nivel en el extranjero, dada la ausencia de este nivel en Bolivia (Rodriguez 1997).

En comparación con otros temas, este es un campo virgen, como lo atestigua la poca producción bibliográfica sobre el mismo. Por ejemplo una búsqueda inicial en Google con el término pedagogía de la investigación arrojo, el día 10 de mayo de 2004, un total de 36 entradas que contenían el mismo. De éstas una gran cantidad se refería a declaraciones de instituciones como la Fundación Carnegie, orientadas al fortalecimiento de la formación, tanto de investigadores como de docentes.

He descrito con gran detalle mi experiencia de volverme investigador en un contexto intercultural en un trabajo no publicado titulado “The Plea(urgency) for reflexivity: The writing of a dissertation biography” (Galindo 2004)

Un primer inventario de esta practica de reflexividad a través del diario de investigación la he realizado en un trabajo no publicado titulado "On the dialectics between process and product in sociological research” (Galindo 2001).

**Authors’ Details**

El autor es profesor de la Universidad Mayor de San Simón. Es doctor en sociología rural por la University of Missouri-Columbia. Actualmente es profesor de sociología educativa y coordinador de la Maestría en Innovación en la Educación Superior (INES) en la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación.
FIRE AND DUST

Dr. Peter McLaren*
University of California, Los Angeles

Abstract
Drawing upon a Hegelian-Marxist critique of political economy that underscores the fundamental importance of developing a philosophy of praxis, the author theorizes a revolutionary Freireian critical pedagogy which seeks forms of organization that best enable the pursuit of doing critical philosophy as a way of life. The authors argues that the revolutionary critical pedagogy operates from an understanding that the basis of education is political and that spaces need to be created where students can imagine a different world outside of capitalism’s law of value (i.e., social form of labor), where alternatives to capitalism and capitalist institutions can be discussed and debated, and where dialogue can occur about why so many revolutions in past history turned into their opposite.

Fire and Dust**

Brothers and sisters in struggle, and all wayworn travelers on the road to socialism, I want to extend words of encouragement and hope to all of you at this important historical moment. We live in a world of fire and dust, where all the rhetoric trumpeted by our wartime leaders and the grinding engines of U.S. military preponderance cannot drown out the chorus of the dead: almost two thousand American soldiers and possibly over a hundred thousand innocent Iraqi civilians killed. Leaders of the imperialist states, hounded by the threat of hubris and trying desperately to rehabilitate their image as guardians of democracy who pledge to fight evil at any cost, cannot help but trip over their words that are ineluctably chafed by deceit and dripping with duplicity. The Bush cabal, ideologically nourished by the placenta of seventeenth century puritan New England and the hairy-chested dreams of the Roman emperors, is feeding its imperial drive with the blood of Iraqis and the willful abandonment of its poor. We need only witness the criminal behavior of the US military in Fallujah and throughout Iraq, and the way it has permitted its poor to suffer and die needlessly in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. When Bush remarked recently that looters in New Orleans and elsewhere in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina should be treated with “zero tolerance” we wish he would use the same standard for dealing with the CEOs of Halliburton and other transnational corporations who regularly loot the citizenry.

Even though intelligence committees gloomily warned that an invasion of Iraq would heighten the terrorist threat to Western interests, our leaders sided with the priorities of capital and the need to expand markets for the sake of ‘national interests’. Their triumphalist call for the defense of freedom and democracy was enough to furnish them with a lethal cover for their imperialist agenda. Although they have rightfully condemned the recent bombing attacks in London and reached out to a woebegone public that is valiantly coming to grips with its fear, it is clear that the policy makers and administration officials in United States and the United Kingdom knew very well that their imperialist wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would spawn a new
generation of terrorists, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but elsewhere throughout the globe. However, their primary objectives were more centered on the quest for oil—accompanied by brutal military assaults, war crimes in Fallujah and elsewhere, geopolitical jockeying, and strategies for attaining advantages for U.S. corporations—than on the future safety and well-being of their citizens.

Poisoned by power, the truculent satraps of the Bush regime need not scruple at the corruption-fueled policies it pursues at the behest of the empire of capital. Not only has it the support of the transnational capitalist class but it also revels in its new unholy alliance with ‘God’s Rottweiler’, Pope Benedict XVI, a religious leader whose reactionary and medievalist political bearings are rabidly anti-modernist, anti-Marxist, anti-gay and anti-feminist (as Cardinal Ratzinger, the new pope urged voters in the United States not to vote for John Kerry, who was guilty of the abomination of being pro-choice, at the risk of spending eternity in the smoldering caverns of hell).

While the pusillanimous inertia of Congress and the media ensured them an easy ride, they are now confronting stiffer opposition, thanks to the consciousness-raising work of grassroots organizations and social movements that continue to shed critical light on the lineaments of our geopolitical present, one that currently witnesses 725 official United States military bases being maintained outside of U.S soil (969 are maintained within the country).

When President Bush sneeringly comments that the United States is fighting the terrorists in Iraq so he won’t have to fight them on U.S. soil, an assertion that invariably presages more armed aggression to come, not only are many more people alerted to his patronizing smirk twisted into what appears to be a rictus of permanent impudence but they also more clearly see the tinfoil hat on his head.

As all of us know, life is going from bad to worse for those who bear the brunt of exploitation under the merciless sword arm of neoliberal capitalism and the class-racialized inequalities that continue to follow in the brutal wake of colonial history. Decisions driven by a monetary calculus—which is more so the case than ever on the part of the rich industrial countries at the center of the capitalist system that continue to use the economic surplus of the countries on the periphery to advance their own expansionist agenda and consolidate their own advantage—will only continue to reproduce the underdevelopment of peripheral capitalist countries while ensuring that the ruling classes at the core amass the vast majority of the world’s wealth. Liberals airily blame events on labor’s aristocrats and their penchant for greed. But that is a bit like blaming the sinking of a freighter by a submarine on water’s hydrogen and oxygen molecules.

For those of us who are fortunate to have some protections by means of our social capital, our daily needs are Lilliputian in comparison to those millions who barely scrape by. State violence and corruption-fueled domestic policies are a common threat to those whose lives have been declared redundant by the aristocrats of labor and the pooh-bahs of commerce who religiously adhere to the unfettered rule of market capitalism, to those who live on the wrong side of the razor-sharp racial divide, to those who suffer most from the destruction of the ecosystem’s regenerative capacities, to those who have been tragically forsaken by the political
establishment, to those who have joined Marx’s reserve army of labor whose “food-free diet” isn’t some fashion trend for the children of the Paris Club. Even today, decades after the so-called victory of capitalism over communism, decades after the election of reactionary Pope John Paul II, and decades after the Thatcher/Reagan revolution to abolish the welfare state, the words “there is no alternative” weighs on the brains of the living like an unspoken epigram in a horror tale about corporations who rule the world with cyborg armies of the night.

To the extent that corporations continue to acquire the rights and freedoms normally reserved for and accorded to human beings, they are wielding such rights in flagrant disregard for those whose labor-power they must acquire (by any means necessary) in order to survive. They are taking hacksaws not only to the web of planetary ecosystems and the objective conditions responsible for the generation of life but also to the covenant that once defined (however tenuously) the social commons and social democratic consensus. The comprador elite never tires of telling us that the rich are the hope of the poor, that the wealthy are the saviors of the downtrodden living in the back alleys in casas de carton. But in reality the rich are getting drunk on the tears of the poor, as their success only sets themselves up to be richer and wealthier. As David Korten writes:

We are told that those who make money are creating wealth that adds to the pie of society’s total wealth. No one loses, so therefore no one should begrudge the wealthy their proper reward for their contribution to the increased well-being of all. Of course it’s a bogus argument. Inflation of the financial bubble increases the claims of the holders of those assets against the world’s shrinking real wealth far out of proportion to any contribution they may have made to real wealth. As a result a fortunate few enjoy multiple vacation homes, private jets, and exotic foods, while the least fortunate are displaced from their homes and farmlands and condemned to lives of homelessness and starvation that bears no relationship to need, contribution to society, or willingness to work. (2004, pp. 16-17)

Not only is the financial system is set up to maintain the gap between the rich and poor, it is structured to keep that gap growing. We can’t step backwards since we can’t reverse neoliberal globalization. But we can transcend it, we can move towards a socialist alternative, we can win a new world.

Capital’s extensive and intensive growth, the increasing fluidity and changeability between capital and the state, the non-territorial domination of underdeveloped countries by developed ones through brute market power and integrated processes of capitalist production (by utilizing cheap labor and controlling raw materials), the dispossession of peasants from their land, the hegemony of the dollar as world currency, the frenetic policing of all territories where capital is accumulated by the attack dogs of the military industrial complex, the alliance of market fundamentalism and religious fundamentalism— all of these features weigh heavily on the brains of the living and strain the shoulders of the world’s poor.
Bill Blum reports:

The poor people of the world fell off the cosmic agenda centuries ago. In India, the homeless are large enough to constitute fair-sized cities, the slums large enough to constitute a major metropolis; "crushing poverty" or "dirt poor" don't quite capture it; "a food-free diet" comes closer. We all know the picture. The Wall Street Journal, though, sees things we don't. "India's economy expanded a larger-than-expected 7 percent during the three months ended March 31," they breathlessly informed us July 5. "India's gross domestic product has recorded some of the biggest growth in the world this year." Gross domestic product ... that's a real beauty that one; you can put almost anything you want in it, like it's a garbage can; anything called a product, anything called a service. You wanna be a good citizen and increase the GDP? Burn down a building (which then has to be rebuilt), or go out and kill someone (services of undertakers, cemeteries, lawyers, etc.) As one economist has noted, marry your cleaning person, and you will make GDP drop (a paid service changing to an unpaid one). So much of it is arbitrary, so arbitrarily complex; and then the complexity is multiplied by comparing the GDP among different countries. Who knows what India puts into its particular garbage can? Is it the exact same garbage calculated in the exact same manner as in the United States? Hardly likely. But economists, politicians, the media, they all make use of their favorite Leading Economic Indicators to paint the kind of picture they want us to see; since India is waist-deep in the joys of globalization it's vital to globalization cheer leaders like the Wall Street Journal to paint smiley faces.

Today, in a world that has witnessed leaders of the dominant capitalist states declaring a permanent war on terror, what were once exceptional conditions are now the rule, as normal legal arrangements have been turned upside down. Anti-democratic laws which grant extra-judicial powers to hold citizens and immigrants without trial are moving modern democracies towards capitalist sovereignty congealed in the shape of totalitarianism. Recently in the United States, the Patriot Act has been extended, eviscerating basic Constitutional rights, as civil society is becoming militarized in the direction of a permanent security state, while political leaders on the right betray an unvarnished contempt for any kind of criticism of US foreign or domestic policy.

This is the perfect setting for postmodernists, who populate the subterranean interworlds of art, politics, and the academy, for they can now boldly pontificate with impunity (and even provoke the admiration of the ruling elite), deconstructing the décor of their servitude in a world where human agency is reduced to a voluble and labile collection of subject positions that disintegrate upon contact, where truth is but an effect of discourse, where university professors and the art house intelligentsia can serve as the absent guardians of disincarnated revolutionary overtures and pure contingency. But if you dare to relinquish the civilized barbarism of the educated elite, and refuse to absolutize the gap between the culture of the masses and those of the learned aesthetes and philomaths, jointly surpassing the boundaries of bourgeois legitimacy, and if you—heaven forbid—forcibly assert a praxis that challenges in the name of a socialist alternative the current retrenchment of our Constitutional rights and the rule of capital, well then, all hell will break loose.
As the events of these last few years attest, Marx’s critique of political economy and materialist conception of history cannot be so easily discarded into the rag-and-bone shop of social history.

When Marx claimed that his aim in Capital was to expose or make visible the economic law of motion of modern society, he was seeking to reveal the inner workings of capitalist economic life—how capitalism works as a political-economic system—that gave birth to specific relations of alienation, relations that affect our lives today, not in the same way, but with the same effects—poverty, unemployment, lack of medical care, homelessness. Wage earners still sell their labor-power, that is, their capacity to labor. Labor-power, the capacity to labor, is the commodity that resides in the person of the laborer (Rikowski, 2005). Labor power—particular capabilities expressed in our labor—is transformed when we participate in commodity-producing activities. It is transformed into value, which Bertell Ollman (2004) describes as the sum of the alienated relations constitutive of capitalist labor. Value, the social form of labor, is created when our capacity to labor is transformed into actual labor as we participate in the production of commodities. In addition to producing material wealth in the form of use-value, the labor process within capitalism also is characterized by a valorization process of producing value that is stored in the commodities. Some of this value is represented in the wages that workers receive in order to reproduce themselves and their families for yet another day of service to the lords of capital. Yet workers always create value over-and-above that represented by the wage—what is commonly called unpaid labor—which becomes transformed into surplus value that makes capitalism possible. Glenn Rikowski (2005) describes labor-power as follows:

Thus the single commodity that has the capacity to yield greater value than that required for its own production and maintenance and whose expenditure is the basis for the generation of value and surplus value and the maintenance of capital’s social universe is a commodity that is internal to and part of the personhood of the laborer. It is this that makes labor-power capital’s weakest link. Workers own the power that generates value, surplus value and hence capital. Thus, they also own the power that can destroy it too as they can decide collectively to produce wealth in a form that does not entail value production.

It what sense does the above description of capitalism have any relevance for today? Does it still have some applicability in our neo-liberal universe of finance capital and what some have called the era of immaterial labor? Bertell Ollman (2004) gives an answer that is consonant with a Marxist humanist analysis of global capitalism set forth in this article. He writes:

[M]y response is that capitalism has changed a great deal since Marx wrote, and that capitalism has changed not at all since that time. What I mean is that the main structures of capitalism—that workers have to sell their labor power to capitalists in order to survive, that capitalists use their control over this labor to produce value and surplus value, that everything that workers produce carries a price and goes into the market, that these goods can only be acquired by people who have enough money to pay this price, that the state serves as the society-wide means by which the capitalist class solves the
distinctive problems it cannot handle on its own, etc., etc.—have changed hardly at all since Marx wrote. And these are the basic structures, relations and processes—essentially, what makes capitalism different from feudalism on one side and socialism on the other—that Marx devoted most of his life to studying.

Just as in Marx’s day, the development of capitalism is concomitant with the growth and consolidation of commonplace understandings of how freedom of the market translates into democratic freedom. The prevailing categories and forms of thought used today to justify foreign and domestic policy in capitalist societies—such as those of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’—are shaped by the social relations of the societies that employ them. And they have contributed to the perpetuation of a class-divided, racialized and patriarchal social order. These forms of thought manifest a certain universality and often reveal the imprint of the ruling class (echoing Marx’s famous dictum that the ideas of the ruling class prevail in every epoch as the ruling ideas). The market as a category in the vernacular of the ruling class is not conceived of as a crucible of exploitation but as a means of opportunity, a means of leveling the playing field, a means of achieving freedom and democracy. But Marx showed that precisely what we need is freedom from the market.

Marx demonstrated how the formal equality of political rights can exist, hand-in-hand, with brute exploitation and suffering. The separation of economic rights and political rights is the very condition of the impossibility of democracy, a separation that liberals have been stunningly unable to challenge in their discourses of reform. In fact, as Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995) and others have pointed out, the constitutive impossibility of democracy in a society built upon property rights significantly accounts for why democracy can be invoked against the democratic imperatives of the people in the gilded name of the global imperium. Property and the market must be served by ensuring that there is too little, not to much, democracy and this cause can be advanced by leaders by making sure that the world exits in a constant state of conflict. This, of course, can only occur when citizens are convinced that ‘freedom is not free’ and that war will always be necessary to defend it (presumably even ‘preventative wars’ waged against those who are deemed to be a threat sometime in the near or distant future). This is precisely how the United States secures its suzerainty, by ruling through the market, by allowing limited autonomy to nations who adhere to the rules of the market, but who agree to keep their populaces subjugated as cheap labor. And by sending its warrior class into furious battle in those recalcitrant arenas where there is resistance to the rulers of the market as well as the market rules, and hence to the conditions of freedom and democracy and its imperial agents and guardians. This is the real meaning of the freedom of the market. The market generates the conditions for the ‘winners’ to create the necessary ideologies for justifying violence on the grounds of ‘us-against-them’ theories of ‘inherent’ competition and violence within the human species. And it provides them with the most formidable weapons available to carry out such violence and, in the case of the United States, to achieve the status (at least for the time being) as the organizing center of the world state.

Here, in the world’s imperial heartland, education has become an epicenter of debate over the meaning of citizenship and the role and status of the United States in world history. Science is under attack in the high schools, theories of evolution are being challenged by those
of creationism and intelligent design, and privatization is destroying what is left of public schools.

An emphasis on testing resulting in a teaching-to-the-test mania, strict accountability schemes, prepackaged and scripted teaching for students of color, and a frenetic push towards more standardized testing—what Kozol refers to as “desperation strategies that have come out of the acceptance of inequality” (2005, p. 51)—have been abundantly present since the mid-1990s. But what has this trend produced? As Jonathan Kozol (2005) point out, since the early 1990s, the achievement gap between black and white children has substantially widened, about the same time as we began to witness the growing resegregation of the schools (when the courts began to disregard the mandates of the Brown decision). This has lead to a what Kozol calls “apartheid schooling”. Kozol reports that in 48 percent of high schools in the country’s largest districts (those that have the highest concentrations of black and Latina/o students), less than half of the entering ninth-graders graduate in 4 years. Between 1993-2002, there has been a 75 percent increase in the number of high schools graduating less than half of their ninth grade high school class in 4 years. In the 94 percent of districts in New York State where the majority of the students are white, nearly 80 percent of students graduate from high school in 4 years. In the 6 percent of districts where black and Latina/o students make up the majority, the percentage is considerably less—approximately 40 percent. There are 120 high schools in New York (enrolling nearly 200, 000 minority students) where, Kozol notes, less than 60 percent of entering ninth-graders make it to the twelfth grade. Such a statistic record has prompted Kozol to exclaim: “There is something deeply hypocritical about a society that holds an eight-year-old inner-city child ‘accountable’ for her performance on a high-stakes standardized exam but does not hold the high officials of our government accountable for robbing her of what they gave their own kids six or seven years earlier” (2005, p. 46).

For many evangelical Christians the history of the United States is deeply providential. For the increasing ranks of Americans who profess to serve no other king but Jesus, they see themselves as moral stewards of a country preordained by God to save humanity. Besotted with the white man’s burden of uplifting the ignorant masses of the Third World so that they might join the ranks of the civilized, evangelical Christians (including and perhaps especially those ‘power puritans’ and ‘opportunistic ayatollahs’ who serve at the helm of the Bush administration) betray a Messianic vision rooted in bad theology and rapture politics and the covenant God has apparently made with consecutive White House administrations throughout history (no doubt more favorably rewarding Republican administrations). With so many professed Christians braying about how important moral values are the United States, it might come as a surprise that

In 2004, as a share of our economy, we ranked second to last, after Italy, among developed countries in government foreign aid. Per capital we each provide fifteen cents a day to official development assistance to poor countries. And it’s not because we were giving to private charities for relief work instead. Such funding increase our average daily donation by just six pennies, to twenty-one cents. It’s also because Americans were too busy taking care of their own, nearly 18 percent of American children lived in poverty (compared with, say, 8 percent in Sweden). In fact, by pretty much any measure of caring for the least among us you want to propose—we come in nearly last among the
rich nations, and often by a wide margin. The point is not that (as everyone already
knows) the American nation trails badly in all these categories, categories to which Jesus
paid particular attention. And it’s not as of the numbers are getting better: the U.S.
Department of Agriculture reported last year that the number of households that were
“food insecure with hunger” had climbed more than 26 percent between 1999 and 2003.
(McKibben, 2005, p. 32)

The attack by the Bush administration on public schools is in part a condemnation of
ungodly secular humanism that is seen as robbing the moral authority of the state of its
imprimatur granted by Jesus, the King of Kings. The same callow calculus cloaked in a sacred
rage has had a hand in defining what is to be considered unpatriotic and anti-American,

What we are seeing in so-called progressive, critical classrooms throughout the United
States is not a pedagogy steeld in opposition to oppression, but rather an ersatz critical
pedagogy, a domesticated approach to Freirean teaching that stresses the centrality of engaging
student experiences and histories. This situation provokes the following sempiternal questions:
Are these histories and experiences self-evident? If not, how are the histories of the oppressed
written and who writes them? How are experiences interpreted and whose interpretation counts
the most? What languages of critique are employed at understanding the formation of student
subjectivities? What languages of possibility? Experiences, after all, are the “effects” of
discursive regimes which, in turn, are given birth in a vortex of contending social forces,
cultural formations, linguistic fields, ideological structures, institution formations, and
overdetermined by social relations of production. Those pedagogies that affirm (through
dominant narratives and discourses that unproblematically valorize democracy and freedom)
student experiences but fail to question how these experiences are produced conjecturally in the
formation of subjectivity and agency, accept a priori the sovereignty of the market over the body
politic, and this, in turn, helps to re-secure a pliant submission to the capitalist law of
value. And they are often the soft-focus pedagogies of the give-advantage-to-the-already-
advantaged, self-empowerment variety. These dominant pedagogies systematically negate
rather than make meaningful alternative understandings of the relationship between identity-
formation and social relations of production. They are not only reflective but also productive
and reproductive of antagonistic social relations, dependent hierarchies of power and privilege
and hegemonic strategies of containing dissent and opposition.

A Pedagogy for Life

We live at a time so brutal and unforgiving that one has to continually question whether
or not you are dreaming. Yet even as we despairingly acknowledge the pain and desperation of
so many living in a state of national and international disequilibria, and recoil at the scale of
capitalist exploitation and environmental degradation in our contemporary world, we still
remain hapless prisoners of the illusion that we live in the best of all possible worlds, if not
grotesquely superabundant, then at the very least satisfactory. This Panglossian illusion (named
after Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide, who responded to all unfortunate events with the
comment: “All if for the best in the best of all possible worlds”) have led us to blunder into an
erroneous justification for perpetual war against ‘evil doers’ and the uncritical acceptance of
global capitalism. This attitude has been given ballast not only by our messianic conviction that we have been ordained to be always on the right side of history but also by the adroit connection of our belief in the unflappable virtue of free market capitalism with the type of construction of national identity that pervades the corporate media (i.e., a toxic admixture of triumphalist statecraft, a providential version of Manifest Destiny, and garage sale apocalyptic mysticism): we must carry the torch of democracy to the far corners of the globe as our God-given duty, even if it means preemptive military strikes and imperialist aggression. True, it may be difficult for mortals to appreciate now but it’s good for the cause of freedom in the long run, and we must trust God and our political leadership (who alone possess the oracular capacity to see that far into the future) that this is so (McLaren and Jaramillo, 2005). And if we find it too solemnly difficult to trust in God, then we should trust in the death-dealing power of our military to make it so.

In order that our social amnesia remain resolutely unacknowledged, we hide behind an almost puritanical fear of any pedagogy that insists on unbolting the door to doubt and squaring our shoulders against unquestioned orthodoxy, and on recognizing our entanglement in the larger conflictual arena of political and social relations and how such an entanglement is itself deeply ensconced in merging religiosity into political ends. Our merciless silence is deafening, and threatens the longevity of our social history. If we wonder how it is that here in the twenty-first century we are witnessing the steady erosion of human rights and civil liberties as well as the devastation of our ecosystems we only have to examine the extent of our political denial and its implication for mis-educating our citizenry.

Motivated by a desire to anchor their students in a coherent worldview and provide them with an enduring stability, teachers especially become an easily breached conduit for the official narratives of the state. The moral panic surrounding the meaning of patriotism in the post 9/11 United States has produced confusion among teachers and students alike—proclivities easily leveraged by the Bush administration through the corporate media that amplify, echo, mirror and appease official government narratives at times of national crisis.

At this moment in history, the work of Paulo Freire threatens to explode the culture of silence that informs our everyday life as educators in the world’s greatest capitalist democracy, a key overarching saga of which has been the successful dismantling of public schooling by the juggernaut of neoliberal globalization and the corporatization of the public sphere. Critical pedagogy’s conscience-in-exile, Freire sought through the pedagogical encounter to foist off the tyranny of authoritarianism and oppression and bring about an all-embracing and diverse fellowship of global citizens profoundly endowed with a fully claimed humanity. Yet instead of heeding a Freirean call for a multi-vocal public and international dialogue on our responsibility as the world’s sole superpower, one that acknowledges that we as a nation are also changed by our relationship to the way we treat others, we have permitted a fanatical cabal of politicians to convince us that dialogue is weakness, an obstacle to peace, and univocal assertion is a strength.

Possibly the greatest reproach that Freire addressed to the authoritarian culture of his time was the devitalization and devaluation of human life, the fragmentation and commodification of subjectivity, and the erection of barriers to freely associated labor, joyful participation in social relations, and the self-development of the subject—an indictment that we
must extend to all of capitalist society. It would be difficult for progressive educators in the United States not to interpret Freire’s message as a call to overthrow the political curates with whom most Americans took refuge after 9/11, priests of disorder who dragged the country deep into some sulfuric swampland populated by church-going elementals and hairy-knuckled demons clutching Bibles—an inferno fit for politicians that even Dante could not imagine. It is surely striking how Freire’s eviscerating pedagogical commentary, by planting the seed of catharsis and thereby placing in our hands the responsibility to overcome the political amnesia that has become the hallmark of contemporary teaching, cannot be officially welcomed into the classrooms of our nation by the guardians of the state. For they have witnessed the unnerving intimacy and camaraderie Freire was able to forge among his admirers worldwide and the extent to which they were challenged by the disseminating force of his liberatory language of hope and possibility. And while teacher education programs have not been able to root him out of the philosophy of teaching, they have cannily managed to domesticate his presence. They have done this by transforming the political revolutionary with Marxist ideas into a friendly sage who advocates a love of dialogue, separating this notion from that of a dialogue of love. Hence, the importance of reclaiming Paulo Freire for these urgent times. Freire was critical of teachers who, while turning their podiums in the direction of history, refused to leave their seminar rooms in order to shape it.

Of particular significance for teachers is one of Freire’s last books, *Teachers as Cultural Workers: Letters to Those Who Dare Teach*. It is significant because it serves as an exhortation to a mindfulness of where we are going as educators, of what kind of world we are living in, of what kind of world we would like to see in its place. I would like to reflect upon some of the themes of this book as a way of addressing the challenge we face as citizens in a desperate and uncertain future. One of the central themes is the importance of a pedagogy powered by love. For Freire, love is preeminently and irrevocably dialogical. It is not an attachment or emotion isolated from the everyday world, but viscerally emerges from an act of daring, of courage, of critical reflection; love is not only the fire that ignites the revolutionary but also the creative action of the artist, wielding a palette of sinew and spirit on a canvas of thought and action, its explosion of meaning forever synchronized with the gasp of human freedom. Freire writes:

> We must dare in the full sense of the word, to speak of love without the fear of being called ridiculous, mawkish, or unscientific, if not antiscientific. We must dare in order to say scientifically, and not as mere blah-blah-blah, that we study, we learn, we teach, we know with our entire body. We do all of these things with feeling, with emotion, with wishes, with fear, with doubts, with passion, and also with critical reasoning. (p.3)

On the topic of love, Freire also writes:

> [T]o the humility with which teachers perform and relate to their students another quality needs to be added: *lovingness*, without which their work would lose its meaning. And here I mean lovingness not only toward the students but also toward the very process of teaching. I must confess, not meaning to cavil, that I do not believe educators can survive the negativities of their trade without some sort of “armed love,” as the poet
Tiago de Melo would say. Without it they could not survive all the injustice or the
government’s contempt, which is expressed in the shameful wages and the arbitrary
treatment of teachers, not coddling mothers, who take a stand, who participate in protest
activities through their union, who are punished, and who yet remain devoted to their
work with students.

It is indeed necessary, however, that this love be an “armed love,” the fighting love of
those convinced of the right and the duty to fight, to denounce, and to announce. It is this form
of love that is indispensable to the progressive educator and that we must all learn. (40-41)

Even the most imperturbably disposed Marxist educators might well respond to Freire’s
focus on love with an acute sense of alarm. For some materialist critics, love does not mix with
Marxist science and should not form the basis of a socialist pedagogy. But John Somerville can
help even the most captious critical educator and committed materialist put the concept of love
in the proper perspective:

Take, for example, such a phenomenon as love. The materialist’s attitude is not that it
should be belittled or discouraged as an activity, emotion, or feeling, unless, of course, it
is being pursued in some destructive way. Neither is his [sic] attitude the cynical one that
“love does not exist,” or that it is not necessary to take seriously the question of
standards, values, and ideals in relation to it. His [sic] attitude is that love is obviously a
very important part of life but that its importance is as an emotional fact, not as an
explanation. More explanation does not mean less love, neither does more love mean
less explanation. Man [sic] needs more of both. (2005, p. 15)

In addition to the quality of lovingness, Freire adds to the characteristics of the progressive
teacher those of humility, courage, tolerance, decisiveness, security, the tension between
patience and impatience, joy of living, and verbal parsimony, often inflecting some of these
terms with nuance and poetic meaning. For instance, Freire denotes humility as the
characteristic of admitting that you don’t know everything; for critical citizens it represents a
“human duty” to listen to those considered less competent without condescension, a practice
intimately identified with the struggle for democracy and a disdain for elitism. Another example
is that of tolerance. For Freire, tolerance is not understood as “acquiescing to the intolerable” or
“coexistence with the intolerable” nor does it mean “coddling the oppressor” or “disguising
aggression”. Freire claims that tolerance “is the virtue that teaches us to live with the different. It
teaches us to learn from and respect the different”. (p. 42)

Freire elaborates:

On an initial level, tolerance may almost seem to be a favor, as if being tolerant were a
courteous, thoughtful way of accepting, of tolerating, the not-quite-desired presence of
one’s opposite, a civilized way of permitting a coexistence that might seem
repugnant. That, however, is hypocrisy, not tolerance. Hypocrisy is a defect; it is
degradation. Tolerance is a virtue. Thus if I live tolerance, I should embrace it. I must
experience it as something that makes me coherent first with my historical being,
inconclusive as that may sound, and second with my democratic political choice. I
cannot see how one might be democratic without experiencing tolerance, coexistence with the different, as a fundamental principle. (p. 42)

*Teachers as Cultural Workers* is a book about according professional recognition to authentically dialogical teaching and learning. But it is anything but the mundane connotation we have come to associate with the term “professional recognition”. As Peter Mayo notes, “By professional, Freire is not referring to the excesses of the ideology of professionalism…based on the trait model of professionals…that often results in the following arrogant posture: I know what’s best for you. Freire is using *profession* in the sense of people who are competent, both in terms of the subject matter taught and in terms of pedagogical disposition, and who engage in very important work that demands respect and adequate renumeration” (2004, p. 84).

And while *Teachers as Cultural Workers* unpacks critical pedagogy as a profession, it dialectically weaves into its discussion of teacher responsibility profound philosophical insight. Freire teaches us that truth is never about unmediated reflections of a real object—something resolutely immutable and transparent. Rather it is always dialogic, always about the self/other. In our spontaneous orientation to everyday life, we do not apply critical reasoning and such knowledge made from experience often lacks epistemological rigor. And while such knowledge should in no way be dismissed as unimportant, it is necessary to understand the importance of knowing the world systematically, by distancing ourselves from it so that we can come closer to it epistemologically and thus be offered what Freire calls “another kind of knowing” and which he describes as “a knowing whose exactitude gives to the investigator or the thinking subject a margin of security that does not exist in the first kind of knowing, that of common sense” (p. 93). Freire argues that both the “innocent” knowing acquired through experience and the systematic knowledge acquired through critical reasoning “implies a debate over practice and theory that can only be understood if they are perceived and captured in their contradictory relationship” (p. 93). Hence, Freire warns us that neither type of knowledge is mutually exclusive and both types of knowledge must be seen in relation to each other. While we must avoid the theoretical elitism that denies the validity of common sense or experiential knowledge, we must at the same time avoid an anti-intellectualism that denies the importance of theoretical knowledge acquired through critical reasoning. On this note, Freire makes clear that “there is never only theory, never only practice” (p. 93). He writes:

Thus the sectarian political-ideological positions—positions that, instead of understanding their contradictory relationship exclude one another—are wrong. The anti-intellectualism denies validity to the theory; the theoretical elitism denies validity to the practice. The rigor with which I approach objects prohibits me from leaning toward either of these positions: neither anti-intellectualism nor elitism but practice and theory enlightening each other mutually. (p. 94)

This dialectical movement that informs theory and practice also informs our identities as social agents. Here, a dialectical tension exists between “what we inherit and what we acquire” (p. 70). According to Freire,

At times in this relationship, what we acquire ideologically in our social and cultural experiences of class interferes vigorously in the hereditary structures through the power of
interests, of emotions, feelings, and desires, or what one usually calls “the strength of the heart.” Thus we are not only one thing or another, neither solely what is innate nor solely what is acquired. (p. 70)

Freire’s dialectics of the concrete (to borrow a phrase from Marxist philosopher Karil Kosik) is very unlike the methodology of the educational postmodernists who, in their artful counterposing of the familiar and the strange in order to deconstruct the unified subject of bourgeois humanism, mock the pieties of monologic authoritarianism with sportive saber slashes across the horizon of familiarity and consensus. Whereas postmodern ‘resistance’ results in a playful hemorrhaging of certainty, a spilling forth of fixed meanings into the submerged grammars of bourgeois society, remixed in the sewers of the social as ‘resistance’ and rematerialized in the art house jargon of fashionable apostasy, Freire’s work retains an unshakable modernist faith in human agency consequent upon language’s ineradicable sociality and dialogical embeddedness. What Freire does have in common with the postmodernists, however, is a desire to break free of contemporary discourses that domesticate both the heart and mind, but he is not content to remain with the postmodernists in the nocturnal world of the subconscious, rather he is compelled to take his critical pedagogy to the streets of the real. Freire writes:

To the extent that I become clearer about my choices and my dreams, which are substantively political and attributively pedagogical, and to the extent that I recognize that though an educator I am also a political agent, I can better understand why I fear and realize how far we still have to go to improve our democracy. I also understand that as we put into practice an education that critically provokes the learner’s consciousness, we are necessarily working against myths that deform us. As we confront such myths, we also face the dominant power because those myths are nothing but the expression of this power, of its ideology. (41)

Freire sees the role of teachers not as “coddling parents” or aunts who live in a pristine world devoid of ideology, of racism, of social classes, but rather as social and political agents who “challenge their students, from an early to a more adult age, through games, stories, and reading so that students understand the need to create coherence between discourse and practice: a discourse about the defense of the weak, of the poor, of the homeless, and a practice that favors the haves against the have-nots; a discourse that denies the existence of social classes, their conflicts, and a political practice entirely in favor of the powerful” (p. 15). In order to achieve this, Freire vehemently opposes both “teacher proof” curricula and self-proclaimed specialists who hold in contempt the critical capacity of teachers to exercise a critical praxis in a coherent manner.

Ultimately, Freire’s work is about establishing a critical relationship between pedagogy and politics, highlighting the political aspects of the pedagogical and drawing attention to the implicit and explicit domain of the pedagogical inscribed in the political. While Freire extolled the virtues of socialism, and drew substantively from various Marxist traditions, he was also critical of dogmatic, doctrinaire Marxists whom he saw as intolerant and authoritarian. In fact, he chastised the practice of some “mechanistic Marxists” whom he claimed believed “that because it is part of society’s superstructure, education has no role to play before the society is
radically transformed in its infrastructure, in its material conditions” (p. 67). In fact, Freire argues that by refusing to take education seriously as a site of political transformation and by opposing socialism to democracy, the mechanistic Marxists have, in effect, delayed the realization of socialism for our times.

As deeply religious as Freire was, nowhere does Freire say that we should act solely in the faith of our certainty and the certainty of our faith, a faith untempered by critical analysis. Freire criticizes those who embrace scientism as intolerant, “because they take science for the ultimate truth, outside of which nothing counts, believing that only science can produce certainty. Those immersed in scientism cannot be tolerant, though that fact should not discredit science” (p. 42). Freire offers a blanket admonishment to the Left, arguing that they have played into the hands of the reactionary Right. The Left’s cardinal mistake, according to Freire, “has almost always been their absolute conviction of their certainties, which makes them sectarian, authoritarian, and religious. In their conviction that nothing outside of themselves made any sense, in their arrogance, in their unfriendliness toward democracy, the dominant classes had the best medium for implementing and maintaining their “dictatorship of class” (p. 14).

Political choices and ideological paths chosen by teachers are the fundamental stuff of Freirean pedagogy. Freire goes so far as to say that educators “are politicians” and that “we engage in politics when we educate” (p. 68). And if it is the case that we must choose a political path, then let us, in Freire’s words, “dream about democracy” while fighting “day and night, for a school in which we talk to and with the learners so that, hearing them, we can be heard by them as well” (p. 68).

This is the central challenge of Freire’s work and one that, especially at this difficult time in world history, requires a dauntless courage, a hopeful vision and a steadfast commitment as we struggle within and against these troubling times.

Towards a Revolutionary Socialist Pedagogy

On a recent trip to Caracas, Venezuela, to support the Bolivarian revolution, I had the opportunity to reflect upon what a socialist pedagogy might mean for the deepening development of a Freirean-based critical pedagogy. At Miraflores Palace, President Hugo Chavez offered me and my colleague, Nathalia Jaramillo, some brief words of hope. Initially he cautioned us that a monster was living in Washington, a monster that has been a disaster for the entire world; in order to bring about a better world we must remain united in our attempts to defeat this monster. While thanking us for the pedagogical work we have been doing he never the less implored us to work harder, and to be inspired by the example of the Bolivarian revolution. By enfranchising Venezuela’s vast working-class through an attack on neoliberalism and a channeling of increased oil revenues into social projects aimed at increasing educational opportunities and medical treatment for the poor, Chavez is creating the conditions of possibility for a robust push towards socialism.

A few days later we were present at a taping of Alo Presidente, Chavez’s weekly television address to the people of Venezuela, and were sitting next to the great Nicaraguan poet of the revolution, Ernesto Cardenal. Responding to an attempt by President Chavez to imagine a
new relationship of solidarity and anti-imperialist struggle between people of good will in the United States and those in Venezuela, Cardenal called President Chavez a prophet who was proclaiming a desire for a mystical union among people from opposing nations based on love:

Mr. President, you have said some things that are very important and moreover are also prophetic …when I was a monk my teacher prophesized that one day the people of the United States and the people of Latin America were going to unite but not with an economic union, nor political, nor military, but a mystic union, of love, of two peoples (or nations) loving each other. I have now heard this from you and I want this to be revealed because it is something that hasn't been heard. I have heard it from my teacher and now you have made it a prophecy. [translated by Nathalia Jaramillo]

How Freirean, indeed!

What is needed now are pedagogies that connect the language of students’ everyday experiences to the larger struggle for autonomy and social justice carried out by groups in pursuit of genuine democracy and freedom outside of capital’s law of value, organizations working towards building socialist communities of the future. That is something taught by Bolivarian educators who are struggling to build a socialist future in a country deeply divided by class antagonisms.

In our pursuit of locally rooted, self-reliant economies, in our struggles designed to defend the world from being forced to serve as a market for the corporate globalists, in our attempts at decolonizing our cultural and political spaces and places of livelihood, in our fight for antitrust legislation for the media, in our challenges to replace indirect social labor (labor mediated by capital) with direct social labor, in our quest to live in balance with nature, and in our various efforts to replace our dominant culture of materialism with values integrated in a life economy, we need to develop a new vision of the future, but one that does not stray into abstract utopian hinterlands too far removed from our analysis of the present barbarism wrought by capital. Our vision of the future must go beyond the present but still be rooted in it, it must exist in the plane of immanence, and not some transcendent sphere where we engage in mystical union with the inhabitants of Mount Olympus. It must attempt to “speak the unspeakable” while remaining organically connected to the familiar and the mundane. We cannot deny the presence of the possible in the contradictions we live out daily in the messy realm of capital. We seek, therefore, a concrete utopia where the subjunctive world of the ‘ought to be’ can be wrought within the imperfect, partial, defective and finite world of the ‘what is’ by the dialectical act of absolute negation. Terry Eagleton makes a similar point when he writes:

We cannot legislate for the future, not least because it is not ours, but the people’s to create. Dreams of the future, as the Frankfurt School reminded us, too often confiscate the very political energies that are necessary for their very realization. Yet there is still something to be said for trying to speak the unspeakable. For the fact is that any authentic future must be to some extent in line with the present as well as discontinuous with it. If it is not—if the future is not somehow inherent in the material forces of the present—then it is just wishful thinking, a vacuous, purely gestural kind of politics. An authentic future must be feasible as well as desirable. Otherwise we will persuade men...
and women to desire uselessly, and so, like the neurotic, to fall ill of longing. In fact, we could claim that utopia is inherent in the present in at least this sense: that without some dim notion of justice, freedom and equality, we would have no standard by which to judge the present, and so would be incapable of identifying its defects. The future is already potentially present in the shape of the blind spots and contradictions of the present—in its silences and exclusions, its conflicts and fragmentations. (2005, pp. 21-22)

The future is very much inherent in the way that we grasp our needs and our capacity to fulfill them. We need to work toward a transformation of the social through a form of concrete as opposed to metaphysical transcendence, through entering into the subjunctive mode of “what-could-be.” But in doing so we must not extend the concept of “what-could-be” to some mystical or ethereal Beyond but place it squarely in the terrain of the “what-is” (Gulli, 2005). We do so in order not to delimit the empirically given as a world of alienation (Gulli, 2005) nor as a staging ground for hope. We do not venture beyond the given and therefore our quest for the transformation of the present into a new social order is not utopian but concrete-utopian. To avoid the folly of utopianism, the realm of the “what-is” must be inclusive of the “what-could-be” (Gulli, 2005).

Not only must we understand our needs and our capacities—with the goal of satisfying the former and fully developing the latter—but to express them in ways that will encourage new cultural formations, institutional structures and social relations of production that can best help meet those needs and nurture those capacities to the fullest through democratic participation. Equally important is realizing through our self-activity and subjective self-awareness and formation that socialism is a collective enterprise that recognizes humankind’s global interdependence, that respects diversity while at the same time builds unity and solidarity. These very principles underlay the ongoing work in Venezuela’s literacy and educational programs taking place in the barrios. Meeting several of the leaders and coordinators of these programs in barrio La Vega, Sector B, emphasized for me the importance of working towards socialism as an endpoint, but not in some teleological sense. Rather, the struggle could best be animated by the words of Antonio Machado’s (1962, p. 826) poem: 

\[
\text{Caminante no hay camino, se hace el camino al andar (traveler, there is no road. The road is made as one walks).}
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In revealing the messy contradiction between universal human rights and the particular interests of specific groups—i.e., the ideological appearance of the universal legal form and the particular interests of the white, bourgeois individual of property that effectively sustain it—criticalists must be careful not to dismiss the notion of the universal as merely a ruse of the dominant social order (it is that, of course, but it is also more). Zizek points out that even the form of the universal has symbolic efficacy and can set into motion important political demands. We should neither reject the universal as a pre-political space outside of the contingency of history, nor reduce it to a fetish of concrete historical processes (Zizek, 2005). We must fight for the “right to universality” for everyone, that is, we must fight for the right of a political agent to assert its radical non-coincidence with itself, that is, its non-coincidence with a particular identity ascribed to it, i.e., as an electrician, plumber, teacher, artisan. Individuals must assert the right always to be supernumeraries, that is, agents with no ‘proper’ place in the
social edifice since they are agents of the “universality of the social itself” (Zizek, 2005, p. 12). A “universal ‘meta-political’ human rights” must therefore form the backdrop of any discussion of the concrete political rights of citizens—hence, universal human rights “designate the precise space of politicization proper” (2005, p. 12). Bruno Gulli describes this as a movement “toward the open space of the universal and common without…renouncing subjectivity” (2005, p. 179). We strive to bring about changes in the economic, social and cultural order not by emptying out subjectivity but by making possible the full development of human capacities for the benefit of all. (Gulli, 2005). Labor must cease to be exploitative and compulsory and become “productive at the level of a fundamental and general social ontology” (Gulli, 2005, p. 179). Thus, labor must cease to become a means to an end (as a means for the augmentation of value) and move beyond the realm of socially necessary labor to become, in Marx’s terms, “the prime necessity of life” (cited in Hudis, 2005a).

Revolutionary critical pedagogy is a socialist pedagogy but one that does not seek a predetermined form or blueprint of socialist society. Neither does it endorse the idea of the spontaneous self-organization of the multitude. It’s praxiological reaching out is similar to what Michael Steinberg refers to as a “negative politics.” Steinberg writes:

A negative politics…is grounded in the fact that our mutual self-constitution continues regardless of the ways in which we construe our experience. It opposes certainties and assurances of knowledge, but not in the name of either a different certainty or of a human characteristic that is presumed to lie beneath the social. It has hopes, not of a world that it already knows how to think about, but one that will not claim to be the culmination of time and that will not hold to ideas, ideals, or even values that seek to arrest the endless transformation of our lives together. It looks not to the perfection of detached knowledge but to an expanding attentiveness to embodied understanding. It is a path not to the future but to a deeper experience of the present. (2005, p. 180)

I want to make the argument that critical educators need to move beyond the struggle for a redistribution of value because such a position ignores the social form of value and assumes a priori, the vampire-like inevitability of the market. We need to transcend value, not redistribute it since we can’t build a socialist society on the principle of selling one’s labor for a wage. Nor will it suffice to substitute collective capital for private capital. As Hudis (2004a) argues, we are in a struggle to negate the value form of mediation, not produce it in different degrees, scales or registers. He goes on to argue that we need freedom, not to revert to some pristine substance or abstract essence prior to the point of production, but the freedom to learn how to appropriate the many social developments formed on the basis of alienated activity, the freedom to realize our human capacities to be free, to be a self directed subject and not merely an instrument of capital for the self-expansion of value, and the freedom to be a conscious and purposeful human being with the freedom to determine the basis of our relationships (Hudis, 2004a). Here, subjectivity would not be locked into the requirements of capital’s valorization process.

Revolutionary critical pedagogy works within a socialist imaginary, that is, it operates from an understanding that the basis of education is political and that spaces need to be created where students can imagine a different world outside of capitalism’s law of value (i.e., social form of labor), where alternatives to capitalism and capitalist institutions can be discussed and
debated, and where dialogue can occur about why so many revolutions in past history turned into their opposite. It looks to create a world where social labor is no longer an indirect part of the total social labor but a direct part it (Hudis, 2005, 2005a), where a new mode of distribution can prevail not based on socially necessary labor time but on actual labor time, where alienated human relations are subsumed by authentically transparent ones, where freely associated individuals can successfully work towards a permanent revolution, where the division between mental and manual labor can be abolished, where patriarchal relations and other privileging hierarchies of oppression and exploitation can be ended, where we can truly exercise the principle ‘from each according to his or her ability and to each according to his or her need’, where we can traverse the terrain of universal rights unburdened by necessity, moving sensuously and fluidly within that ontological space where subjectivity is exercised as a form of capacity-building and creative self-activity within and as a part of the social totality: a space where labor is no longer exploited and becomes a striving that will benefit all human beings, where labor refuses to be instrumentalized and commodified and ceases to be a compulsory activity, and where the full development of human capacity is encouraged. It also builds upon forms of self-organization that are part of the history of liberation struggles worldwide, such as the 1871 Paris Commune or Cuba’s Consejos Populares formed in 1989, or those that developed during the civil rights, feminist and worker movements and those organizations of today that emphasize participatory democracy.

Michael Lebowitz (2005) talks about the possibility of ‘another kind of knowledge’ that might exist in a world that is able to transcend capitalism—a socialist world. He urges us to think about what it would be like to operate in a world by means of a direct social knowledge that cannot be communicated through the indirect medium of money: a knowledge tacitly based upon recognition of our unity and solidarity:

It is a different knowledge when we are aware of who produces for us and how, when we understand the conditions of life of others and the needs they have for what we can contribute. Knowledge of this type immediately places us as beings within society, provides an understanding of the basis of all our lives. It is immediately direct social knowledge because it cannot be communicated through the indirect medium of money. (2005, p. 64)

This is a knowledge, affirms Lebowitz, “which differs qualitatively and quantitatively from the knowledge we have under dominant social relations” (2205, p. 65). It is different precisely because knowledge is no longer treated as a scarce commodity; there is no longer a monopolization and restriction on knowledge as private gain. This type of knowledge, writes Lebowitz, has to be based on certain values, values that are, he notes, enshrined in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, especially Article 299 that is based on “ensuring overall human development” and in Article 20, that stipulates that “everyone has the right to the free development of his or her own personality”, and Article 102, where the focus is upon “developing the creative potential of every human being and the full exercise of his or her personality in a democratic society” (2005, pp. 66-67). Such development can only occur through participation (as set out in Article 62) in democratic social formations that enable self-management, co-management, and co-operation in many forms (as set out in Article 70). Lebowitz’s example of Venezuela and its Constitution is a good one, and one that critical
educators everywhere would do well to consider for deepening their approach to their own particular struggles.

We are currently living in what Antonio Gramsci called a ‘war of position’ – a struggle to unify diverse social movements in our collective efforts to resist global capitalism—in order to wage what he called ‘a war of maneuver’, that is, a concerted effort to challenge and transform the state, to create an alternative matrix for society other than value. Part of our war of position is taking place in our schools.

Critical Pedagogy for a Better Society

While there is much talk about labor today, and the decline of the labor movement, what is important for educators to keep in mind is the social form that labor takes. In capitalist societies, that social form is human capital (Rikowski, 2005). Schools are charged with educating a certain form of human capital, with socially producing labor power, and in doing so enhancing specific attributes of labor power that serve the interests of capital. In other words, schools educate the labor-power needs of capital—for capital in general, for the national capital, for fractions of capital (manufacturing, finance, services, etc.), for sectors of capital (particular industries, etc.), or for individual capital (specific companies and enterprises, etc.), and they also educate for functions of capital that cut across these categories of capitals (Rikowski, 2005). General education, for instance, is intentionally divorced from labor-power attributes required to work within individual capitals and is aimed at educating for capital-in-general. Practical education tries to shape labor-power attributes in the direction of skills needed within specific fractions or sectors of capital. Training, on the other hand, involves educating for labor-power attributes that will best serve specific or individual capitals (Rikowski, 2005).

It is important to note that Rikowski has described capital not only as the subsumption of concrete, living labor by abstract alienated labor but also as a mode of being, as a unified social force that flows through our subjectivities, our bodies, our meaning-making capacities. Schools educate labor-power by serving as a medium for its constitution or its social production in the service of capital. But schools are more than this, they do more than nourish labor-power because all of capitalist society accomplishes that; in addition to producing capital-in-general, schools additionally condition labor-power in the varying interests of the marketplace. But because labor-power is a living commodity, and a highly contradictory one at that, it can be re-educated and shaped in the interests of building socialism, that is, in creating opportunities for the self-emancipation of the working-class.

Labor-power, as the capacity or potential to labor, doesn’t have to serve its current master—capital. It serves the master only when it engages in the act of laboring for a wage. Because individuals can refuse to labor in the interests of capital accumulation, labor-power can therefore serve another cause—the cause of socialism. Critical pedagogy can be used as a means of finding ways of transcending the contradictory aspects of labor-power creation and creating different spaces where a de-reification, de-commodification, and decolonization of subjectivity can occur. Critical pedagogy is an agonistic arena where the development of a discerning political subjectivity can be fashioned (recognizing that there will always be socially- and-self-imposed constraints).
Revolutionary critical pedagogy (a term coined by Paula Allman) is multifaceted in that it brings a Marxist humanist perspective to a wide range of policy and curriculum issues. The list of topics includes the globalization of capitalism, the marketisation of education, neoliberalism and school reform, imperialism and capitalist schooling, and so on. Revolutionary critical pedagogy (as I am developing it) also offers an alternative interpretation of the history of capitalism and capitalist societies, with a particular emphasis on the United States.

Revolutionary classrooms are prefigurative of socialism in the sense that they are connected to social relations that we want to create as revolutionary socialists. Classrooms generally try to mirror in organization what students and teachers would collectively like to see in the world outside of schools—respect for everyone’s ideas, tolerance of differences, a commitment to creativity and social and educational justice, the importance of working collectively, a willingness and desire to work hard for the betterment of humanity, a commitment to anti-racist, anti-sexist, and anti-homophobic practices, etc.

**Educators as Philosophers of Praxis**

Drawing upon a Hegelian-Marxist critique of political economy that underscores the fundamental importance of developing a *philosophy of praxis*, revolutionary critical pedagogy seeks forms of organization that best enable the pursuit of *doing critical philosophy as a way of life*. And that means finding time to read Marx, Hegel and other major thinkers, and developing a coherent way to live out our findings and discoveries and rearticulate them for the very specific times that we live in and for the unique struggles that lie ahead. I very much support the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela, and this is one of the aspects that I am interested in: examining the pedagogical practices of Bolivarian educators as a way of developing a broader philosophy of praxis. What are the specifics of this revolution, and how is it possible to develop a coherent revolutionary pedagogical approach? Obviously we can’t transplant revolutionary critical pedagogy—North American style—in Venezuela, since it will emerge among the Bolivarian educators there with very distinct attributes and characteristics—as well with as a specific trajectory and tendency. But we can be part of a collective effort, and what we learn about pedagogical struggle there we can also introduce here so long as we are careful to reinvent—and restate—such pedagogical knowledge in the contextual specificity of our own struggle.

The discourses we use to understand our subjective location in history’s conjunctural present must not only serve as a means of describing in capillary detail capitalism’s torsion of anguish and hydra-headed barbarism that confronts on a daily basis the poor and powerless in all manner of pain and despair, or even of interpreting it, but must be a whole structure of thinking for collective freedom, for transforming the present. To achieve this we need a dialectical approach: to intervene in the project of our own self and social formation by viewing the present as the future of our past, which is in the process of becoming the past of our own future. Such a dialectical approach is best conceived within the framework of a Marxist humanism. As Peter Hudis (2004) has remarked, Marxist humanism is not the only approach to appreciate the importance of spontaneous self-activity or to argue that mass practice gives rise to new theory or that the experience of resistance on the streets are, in effect, expressions of theory. But Marxist humanism is unique in many important respects. Hudis notes, for instance, that Marxist
humanism maintains that the movement from practice is actually a form of theory and that theory is not the same as philosophy.

Hudis makes an important distinction between philosophy and theory, and urges that we attempt to integrate both into everyday praxis. Philosophy is appropriated without adopting the contemplative standpoint that defines much traditional theory. It does this by penetrating and grasping what Karel Kosik (1976, p. 1) calls the “thing itself.” In other words, philosophy is positioned away from its traditional concern with inner life by bringing the ideas of mental and manual, philosophy and reality, together as a praxiological dimension of the committed intellectual as critical pedagogue. According to Peter Hudis (2004), philosophy “is distinct from theory in that it recognizes the profound relation between the subject and the world in seeking to grasp the ‘thing itself’.” By ‘thing itself’ Hudis (2004) refers, like Kosik, to “not only…external objects but also to the categories which underlay human cognition.” He goes on to say that

Philosophy is different from theory as it is traditionally understood in that it does not take its premises for granted. Philosophy is not about “accepting” certain fixed truths which one then simply projects without further self-examination. Philosophy subjects everything to self-examination, even its own premises—-not for the sake of just tearing things down (that would be sophistry) but as part of creating something new.

Hudis reminds us that while philosophy is a qualitatively superior form of cognition, it doesn’t mean that we dispense with theory. This is because the practice of philosophy means taking part in rigorous theoretical debate and discussion. Because only through theoretic work can philosophical conclusions be adequately justified. But theory is, in itself, insufficient. In fact, what is necessary, according to Hudis, is a Marxist-Humanism that stipulates a qualitatively new approach that fuses theory and philosophy so that “thought ceases to take its premises for granted” (Hudis, 2004). While we continue to justify our philosophical conclusions theoretically, we need to understand that cognition is not only about using theory to justify certain assumptions and claims—those must continue to be critically examined. A critical fusion of theory and philosophy prevents fixed conclusions from being projected by holding onto certain assumptions. Ideas themselves must, after all, be developed to their logical conclusion. Marxist-Humanist philosophers, however, are able to redefine the image of thought as the way that we think. Hudis asserts how Marxist-humanist philosophy and its fusion of theory and philosophy is able to free thought “from a contemplative or formalist relation to reality by posing the reunification of mental and manual abilities in the individual.” Here, philosophy and theory as they are joined together in a manner that enables their unity to permeate our very mode of being in all facets of our existence (in a manner that is faithful to Hegel’s absolute method) are interpenetrated by voices from below enabling at the same time theory and practice to be concretized in each living individual. This gives each and every individual the capacity to become philosophers and to exercise such a capacity in the interest of understanding the meaning of contemporary life in order to change it. Here theory and practice are not formally opposed, but are unified and concretized in living and breathing individuals of history.
The philosophy that is needed at this important time in history is Marx’s philosophy of ‘revolution in permanence’ expanded to its next stage of dialectical development. This message is one that should not be lost to critical educators.

To use Bertell Ollman’s description of the Marxian dialectic in a somewhat different register, we must learn to see the result of our own preconditions as social agents as the precondition of what will become its result and its own negation. And in doing so we must become active agents willing and capable of intervening in such a history so that one day the capitalist exploitation currently driving humanity into an abyss will be seen as the prehistory of a socialist present.
Notes


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*Author’s Details*

Peter McLaren is a Professor of Education at the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, University of California at Los Angeles. His works covers subjects ranging from traditional schooling, to media and popular culture and education as a revolutionary act. He is among the leading critical pedagogists in North America and is involved in a wide-range theoretical and community-based research projects.
THE DIMENSIONS OF REFLECTION: A CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Susan E. Noffke* University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Marie Brennan** University of South Australia

Abstract
In the article, authors identify some of the problems in the present notions of reflective teaching. The authors argue that none of these conceptions deal with reflection itself in a reflexive way. They tend to use theories of reflection as a canopy for their own "middle level" theorizing about reflective teaching. First, the authors consider the development of the term and some of its popularization in teacher education. Some problems the authors identify are located in the history of the concept "reflection" and its philosophical underpinnings. Others emerge from particular applications within teacher education itself. Their critique challenges the prevalent conceptions of reflection and proceeds to offer new direction for further reconstruction of the theory and practice of reflective teaching. The final section offers an alternative conceptualization of "reflection" designed to address many of the concerns the authors raise, while acknowledging that some will always need to be addressed as a continual process.

Delving into Reflection
In the 1980's, the term "reflective teaching" became popularized in the literature about teacher education in both pre-service and in-service settings. Yet all too often, writers and promulgators of reflective practice then and now have taken for granted the crucial issue in either theoretical or practical terms of what reflection is. There are significantly different philosophical and political underpinnings of the versions of reflection which are being promoted. It is possible for people of very different political and ethical persuasions to support the same strategy, "reflective teaching", as long as these underlying beliefs remain unarticulated and unexamined. These different usages may be contradictory. Thus it is difficult to build on others' work in the field or to provide a more systematic overview of the term-in-use. The popularization of "reflective teaching" seems linked to those moves to reconstitute the role of the teacher which have emerged from various sources such as the work on teacher thinking, the work on teachers' practical theories, and the proposals to alter the way in which pre-service teacher education occurs. For example, the Holmes Report placed reflection at the heart of their agenda: "reflective practical experience" is to be part of the prescription for making education more "intellectually sound" (Holmes Group, 1986: 62). Currently the subject of much interest in the teacher education field, reflective teaching deserves further clarification.

"Reflective teaching", in its various guises, can be seen as a movement - a growing group of varied actors who use the term as a slogan and what its practices imply as a means of altering the assumptions of teaching and of teacher education, of resisting narrow conceptions of the teaching role and, often, as a contribution to the reform of schooling and of educational research. The term "reflective teaching" then is not merely a slogan in itself, but part of a larger "slogan system" (Komisar and McClellan, 1961), one which covers and cloaks various and
conflicting aims.

Much of the literature on reflective teaching presents an explicitly oppositional stance to other forms of teacher education and in-service, particularly those forms which these writers characterize as "technical" or instrumental, where the teacher or student teacher would be treated as the object of research or the implementer of techniques which others devise. This literature could be characterized as part of a larger movement aimed, broadly, at "democratizing" the process of schooling. On the other hand, the term is also used by those whose aim seems to be the further development of those technical or instrumental means, in the interests of further "professionalization".

In this paper we identify some of the problems in the present notions of reflective teaching. None of these conceptions deal with reflection itself in a reflexive way. They tend to use theories of reflection as a canopy for their own "middle level" theorizing about reflective teaching. First, we consider the development of the term and some of its popularization in teacher education. Some problems we identify are located in the history of the concept "reflection" and its philosophical underpinnings. Others emerge from particular applications within teacher education itself. Our critique challenges the prevalent conceptions of reflection and proceeds to offer new direction for further reconstruction of the theory and practice of reflective teaching. The final section offers an alternative conceptualization of "reflection" designed to address many of the concerns we raise, while acknowledging that some will always need to be addressed as a continual process.

Development and Popularization of the Term

During the 1980's, the term "reflective teaching" has become popularized in educational circles. In the U.S.A., the staff of the teacher pre-service elementary education program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison contributed to this growing popularity in a series of papers (See Zeichner 1980, 1981-1982; Grant and Zeichner, 1984; Liston and Zeichner, 1987a and 1987b). While the term and its practice have become more sophisticated and elaborated over the years, its central direction has remained consistent. Pre-service teachers were encouraged to undertake "reflective teaching" as a way of making "the journey from the student's desk to the teacher's desk" (Grant, 1984: ix). For them, becoming reflective is a "choice" that is highly favored because

Teachers who are unreflective about their work uncritically accept...everyday reality in schools and concentrate on finding the most effective and efficient means to achieve ends and to solve problems that have been defined for them by others. These teachers lose sight of the fact that their everyday reality is only one of many possible alternatives. They tend to forget the purposes and ends toward which they are working" (Grant and Zeichner, 1984: 4).

"Reflective teachers", on the other hand, "actively reflect upon their teaching and upon the educational, social and political contexts in which their teaching is embedded" (Grant and Zeichner, 1984: 4).

In Britain and Australia, the term was used more in conjunction with teacher in-service,
as part of the "teachers as researchers" and action research movements in those countries (See Stenhouse, 1975; Elliot & Adelman, 1973; Kemmis, et al., 1982; Carr & Kemmis, 1986). Australia's action research movement, while not characterized by consensus, clearly placed itself in a critical social science tradition. Reflection in this context is part of the "organization of processes of enlightenment...of the group" (Carr and Kemmis, 1986: 146). The epistemological basis was clearly developed:

Theories are not bodies of knowledge that can be generated out of a practical vacuum and teaching is not some kind of robot-like mechanical performance that is devoid of any theoretical reflection. Both are practical undertakings whose guiding theory consists of the reflective consciousness of their respective practitioners (Carr and Kemmis, 1986: 113).

By situating its tradition within critical social science rather than teacher education practice, the Australian literature acknowledged its overtly political character more than the U.S. version of reflection. It also regarded reflection as only one element of a movement toward emancipatory action research, rather than the major focus of attention. Reflection, thus, was part of an overall way to approach empowerment of teachers through in-service activity. By working with teachers rather than student teachers, such work could also call on and resonate with a greater tradition of political awareness and action than is possible in connection with student teachers.

Some Contextual Problems

That the term "reflective teaching" should have become popular ought to be cause for rejoicing in times when the teacher is becoming even more subject to hierarchical controls and "mechanized" forms of accountability and evaluation (Apple, 1983). There is, however, evidence to suggest that the term "reflective teaching" has now become part of a slogan system, obscuring more than it reveals about its own values and stances, even among those groups which attempt to use it as a form of critique. Recent meetings of educational organizations have included increasing numbers of papers dealing with various aspects to "reflective teaching". At the 1987 and 1988 annual meetings of the AERA, and the 1988 meeting of the ATE, a large number of papers were concerned with the topic, even if one only goes by the titles printed in the program. Yet this in no way implies that the practices and their theoretical and epistemological conceptions are congruent either in their aims or assumptions. Indeed, there would appear to be wide-spread variation.

What is clear is that, in the course of its growth in popularity, the term has been used by groups with a range of very different reasons for focusing on teacher education. For instance, the Holmes Report (1986) legitimizes, to an extent, the usage of the term. Yet this can be seen as a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it may give freedom to those wishing to try to extend their practice in line with a particular reflective teaching model. On the other hand, the context in which the "blessing" is given is fundamentally opposed to the epistemological basis of the promulgators of at least some versions of the term, for example at the UW - Madison. Instead of promoting teacher self-reliance and critical deliberation in the selection and production of knowledge, the Holmes Report undermines its support for reflective teaching by detailing more measures to control curriculum and evaluation of teachers, both pre- and in-service. Promoting a
policy of encouraging teacher reflection, while instituting measures of greater control over teachers and teacher education courses, serves to obscure the nature and growth of that external influence under a rhetoric of "greater teacher autonomy".

In this guise, the term and associated practices may function actively to hide the tendency towards deskilling in various forms, because of the existence of "reflective teaching" in the public rhetoric. Popularity of a term does not mean that others understand or use it in the same way as the originators intend (See, for example, Cruickshank, 1985, Cruickshank, et al., 1981, and response of Gore, 1987). The main paradigm for teacher education, dominant in at least the media and major reports on education, seems to be "teacher-as-technician". This profers neither training in, nor even allows for the prospect of, any form of critical intellect operating in the student teacher's education course or in the schools or classrooms for which the prospective teachers are being "fitted". It is precisely this version of teacher education that the concept of reflective teaching at the UW has been developed to resist. Paradoxically, the term's popularity may work to undermine the U.W.'s usage. Cruickshank's entrepreneurial packaging of reflective teaching as a series of techniques is clearly an anathema to those who see reflection as an element in political transformation of the schools and the role of teachers.

However, avoidance of dominant or preferred usage of a term is not per se a bad thing, since variety in usage may lead to widespread innovation and experimentation under a general rubric of "reflective teaching". It may also be a healthy sign of loose theoretical and political alliances. At the same time, it may also work toward the means to overcome the deskilling of teachers' work. At least by calling on the intellectual tradition, however much its basis may be in dispute, the "reflective teacher" approach leaves some hope that the student teachers who experience this form of teacher education may have some analytic and critical doubt about their role and the role of educational institutions in reproducing and controlling the students - and themselves.

It is important to recognize that the term "reflection" itself is not a static representation of a particular reality. In educational discourse, it has a history and carries that history with it, however much redefined in use and rhetoric by a program or literature. History and common understandings of the term help to define its use by students and staff, even if they are unaware of it. While the term may escape its forebears, the continuing use of "cognitive" psychology and an over-reliance on the individual as "reflector" suggest that in this case, such escape is more difficult to achieve. Common sense usage of "reflection" as something that occurs with the aid of a mirror tends also to work against the redefinition of the term to incorporate critical and action-oriented dimensions. If the function of reflection is to mirror reality, the action element is missing and reflection tends also to remain a privatized activity.

As a term, "reflection" labels both what is relevant and what is seen to be irrelevant to an analysis of teaching and knowledge generally. It includes as relevant, partly by its history, a notion of the thinking individual within the Western rational tradition. This has a, perhaps subsidiary, function of drawing on the legitimacy of the university as the bearer of this tradition - enabling universities to continue to exert power through labeling teacher activities. Perhaps the term performs a hidden function. On the surface, it appears to call upon a particular intellectual tradition. Yet it may also act to further restrict the freedom allowed to teachers, and,
in this instance, student teachers, to think rigorously and systematically about their own work. The use of academic labels may mystify or make foreign the forms of critical thinking which student teachers/teachers may themselves already use (i.e. re-label and reassign "ownership"). They may well not recognize their own developed or natural faculties in the form of the label "reflective". The common usage of the term may also appear foreign once appropriated by the university. This may work to deskill teachers from their existing habits and practices, or even to alienate them further from the intellectual and collegiate practices necessary for any alteration in the material or conscious environment which they experience as a group.

What Meanings Underlie Reflection?

Most of the people writing about the practice of reflection, especially in education, invoke the work of philosophers such as Dewey, Habermas, and van Manen to provide a canopy for their work. They then proceed to develop "middle level" theory about reflective practice, within the framework provided. The implications for the philosophic frameworks of the "middle level" theory are rarely examined reflexively. In this next section of the paper, we turn to "unpack" some of the current usages of reflection and the possible theoretical challenges to them.

Dewey's definition of "reflective action" is often used as the basis for the arguments in favor of the use of "reflective teaching". "Reflective action" is the counterpart to Dewey's "routine action". As interpreted by Grant and Zeichner, it includes "behavior which involves active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or practice in light of the grounds that support it and the further consequences to which it leads" (1984: 4). Attitudes of "openmindedness", "responsibility", and "wholeheartedness" are seen as characteristic, and emancipation from routine and the enabling of planned, purposive action are the outcomes (Zeichner, 1981-1982: 6-8).

In contrast, "routine action" is "behavior which is guided by impulse, tradition, and authority" (Grant and Zeichner, 1984: 4), which leads "to further enslavement for it leaves the person at the mercy of appetite, sense and circumstance" (Dewey, 1933: 89, cited in Grant and Zeichner, 1984: 5). Grant and Zeichner seem further to interpret "routine action" to mean an acceptance of a particular, socially constructed reality:

In any social setting, and the school is not exception, there exists a taken-for-granted definition of everyday reality in which problems, goals, and the means for their solution become defined in particular ways. As long as everyday life continues without major interruption, this reality is perceived to be unproblematic. Furthermore, this dominant world view is only one of the many views of reality that would theoretically be possible, and it serves as a barrier to recognizing and experimenting with alternative viewpoints (Grant and Zeichner, 1984: 4).

This "dominant world view", an effect of hegemony, leads to a difficulty in recognizing that reality is socially constructed: what Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) call "misrecognition". However, "reflective teaching", by its very existence, presumes that "reality" need not be taken for granted, that some other way of looking at the world is possible. Reflective teaching is thus defined as much by its opposition to what is perceived as a bad "norm", as it is directly. Students, too, seem to sense the oppositional nature of reflection as it is
presented by Grant and Zeichner. Yet discussion of the constraints on reflection reveals more than just a concern with the time and energy involved. To them, an almost structural limitation is present. Some students interpret the answer to the question "Can one be reflective?" to include a recognition that real power relationships can impinge on their "chosen" actions. This can be seen as, in part, a result of seeing an as yet unarticulated connection between reflection and action.

To Grant and Zeichner, though, "choosing between becoming a reflective teacher or an unreflective teacher is one of the most important decisions that you (prospective teachers) will have to make" (p.4). Assuming the power of teachers to make such a choice, they defend "reflectivity" thoroughly - answering objections, from both the standpoints of practicability and necessity (1984: 8-13. Also Zeichner, 1981-1982: 8-11).

The majority of students seem to agree, and to embrace the concept of reflectivity "wholeheartedly". One student remarked, "How can anyone not think about what they're doing?" While in one way this could be seen as a rather naive question, in another it needs to be taken seriously, for the choice may not be one of "routine" versus "reflective", or even some point on a continuum between them, but rather, "Reflective about what?" More clear distinctions need perhaps to be made between possible foci for reflection and among various kinds of activities involved in reflection.

Partially as a result of this need, the work of Van Manen (1977) has been used to offer some guidance (e.g. Zeichner, 1981-1982). Based on his understanding of the relationship between particular "orientations" in social science (the "empirical-analytic", the "hermeneutic-phenomenological", and the "critical-dialectical") and their respective "cognitive interests", van Manen identifies three "distinct ways of knowing and distinct modes of being practical" (p. 205). These, in turn, define the parameters of three hierarchical "levels of reflectivity" (van Manen, 1977: 226). At his "lowest" level, the "principles of technological progress - economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" are seen to influence practical choices between instrumental means to achieve given ends. The "middle" level is concerned with the value commitments that are seen to underlie all educational choices. "Practical" here, refers to an interpretive process whereby "individual and cultural experiences, meanings, perceptions, assumptions, prejudgments, and presuppositions" are analyzed and clarified as a part of decision-making (p.226).

"Critical reflection" forms Van Manen's "highest" level. Here, the practical "assumes its classical politico-ethical meaning of social wisdom". Questions concerning the "worth of knowledge" and the "social conditions necessary for raising the question of worthiness in the first place" are pursued through "a constant critique of domination, of institutions, and of repressive forms of authority" (p.227). The aim of such "critical reflection" is not the efficiency and effectiveness of the technical level, nor the understanding of the interpretive level, but: a distortion-free model of a communication situation that specifies social roles and social structures of a living together in unforced communication; that is, there exists no repressive dominance, no asymmetry or inequality among the participants of the educational processes. Universal consensus, free from delusions or distortion, is the ideal of a deliberative rationality that pursues worthwhile educational ends in self-determination, community, and on the basis of justice, equality, and freedom (van Manen, 1977: 227).
Emergent Issues and Theoretical Shortcomings
"Levels" of Reflection?

It is difficult to refute or even disagree with such a worthwhile and comprehensive goal, especially given the broad, very general terms it employs, and, in fact, such a refutation is not the intention here. Yet there are problems in applying this early Habermasian, tripartite framework to the everyday thoughts and actions of classroom teachers. Van Manen's "ways of being practical", although sound in their logical correspondence to his "ways of knowing", seem to assign the major part of teachers' thoughts to the "lowest" level. The actual contents of their reflections remain undifferentiated and obscure. They are also, at least by implication, not as important. Van Manen asserts in his introductory paragraph, that his purpose was "to demonstrate that it is only through such critical reflection that the questions of greatest significance to the field can be adequately addressed" (p. 205).

The point here is not to refute the contention that issues of "greatest significance" can only be responded to through "critical reflection", but that the hierarchical levels define away most teacher thinking without offering a clear contrast toward which a teacher (or any other practitioner/worker) might aspire. There is an implicit elitism that not only names the "practical" of most teachers as lowly and less significant, but also offers no guidance as to how to raise their "level of reflectivity". Indeed, connections and interrelationships between levels of reflection are obscured, making the development of "better" reflection more difficult.

Taken together, these models of reflection form a sort of "deficit model" of teacher thinking. Van Manen describes:

Teachers freely engage in much talk about their everyday curriculum practices. But whether this talk is heard in the staff room or around the curriculum committee table, it seldom displays the level of deliberative reflectivity that one might hope to hear. When teachers are involved in the process of daily planning, adapting materials, developing courses, arranging subject matter content, teaching, evaluating, and so forth, they do so largely uncritically and unreflectively (p. 206).

While there is a body of educational research that would support van Manen's contention (e.g. Zeichner, 1981-82; Lieberman and Miller, 1984), it is doubtful whether it meets van Manen's standards for critical research forms. More importantly, the experiences of many classroom teachers, including our own, tell us that this is simply incorrect. The accounts presented still fail to explain why teachers seem to be preoccupied with certain kinds of thinking and doing.

Teachers do think and think carefully about what they do. Much of the literature on the teacher's workplace may not be sensitive enough to capture the contradictions and complexities in teachers' thinking. For example, teachers often have the opportunity to participate in curriculum development. If they do not participate, or they engage in purely means-oriented discussion, accepting state or textbook recommended goals, their understanding of their own working conditions must also be considered. Lack of, or extremely low pay for committee work, perception of eventual pushes for "accountability", family pressures, and an awareness of time
commitments, previous history of administrative non-support, and low rewards for innovation discourage many forms of teacher thinking. It is important to note, too, that while these may not be manifest in the discourse of teachers' lounges, they nonetheless reflect a great deal of "critical" thought.

On the other hand, it is important that we not romanticize teachers' work, thereby also ignoring the material constraints that make it difficult for teachers to reflect. The current reforms, some of which actually use the term "reflective teaching", themselves can be seen to restructure teachers' labor, according to principles of external control. These actively undercut the teachers' capacity to redirect their own efforts, based on their own individual and collective reflections. Such a reconstruction of labor must not be seen as an enhancement of "professionalism", but rather as a form of labor degradation. Instead of promoting teacher reflection and action as a part of the fulfilling qualities of the work, the real impact of the reports is to lead teachers to seek fulfillment outside of their workplace.

A partial resolution of some of these issues and shortcomings can be found in the literature on supervision in an "inquiry-oriented" program. Zeichner and Liston (1985), in developing a category system for analyzing supervisory conferences found that van Manen's "levels", while corresponding to the goals of their teacher education program, "did not adequately capture the existential reality of the supervisory discourse" (p. 161). They attributed this to van Manen's reliance on "categories which were formulated within the realm of the theoretic", while the discourse of supervisors and teachers was primarily concerned with "practical problems" - those relating to "past, present, and future pedagogical actions" (p. 161). This definition of "practical" as related directly to actions within the classroom, led Zeichner and Liston to formulate six "substantive categories, differentiating what supervisors and student teachers talked (and presumably thought) about" - the content of the discourse. The forms of discourse within the conferences were classified according to four "logical" categories: factual, prudential, justificatory, and critical, corresponding, in turn, to discussions of what did or will take place, suggestions or advice emanating from evaluations of worth (judged in terms of aims rather than principles), reasons and rationales for actions together with their contributing factors, and assessments of rationales or embedded values (Zeichner and Liston, 1985).

While useful in seeing the parameters of possible discussions about, and therefore the nature of reflection on teaching, this category system does not, nor was it intended to, direct us toward specific recommendations for reflection. It does, however, do much to identify areas of concern to teachers and prospective teachers, and to sort out the complexities of those areas. It does not, as van Manen's "levels" do not, show relationships between areas of concern within the substantive categories and the form of the discourse itself. Are there, for instance, connections between particular substantive categories (e.g. curriculum and materials) that could lead toward certain logical categories (e.g. critical discourse)?

Other questions remain: What, exactly, constitutes "critical"? Is it "better", as van Manen clearly believes? How much of it would be desirable in a "reflective" teacher? Within the substantive category of "context" are factors related to each other and to the remaining categories, which could provide for any form of "logical" discourse? For example, educational research could be discussed as it relates to an identified problem in lesson procedures. It could
also lead to a discussion of the influence of research produced within a university, marketed by textbook or testing companies, acting in conflict to the teacher's own pedagogical vision. Which combinations or directions for thought should be encouraged as being "reflective"? More specifically, how can issues relating to gender, race and class enter the discourse of teacher thinking? How can study of the effects of politics, economics, and culture be approached?

The issues addressed above point to a number of theoretical shortcomings which must be addressed in order for a more adequate notion of reflection to be developed. First, there is a need for a broader understanding of the concrete, material world of those whose labor is in schools. The real conditions of teachers' work form not just the constraints, but also the substance of their reflections. Also the fact that means-oriented deliberations, too, take time and energy, must be recognized. An adequate explanation of teacher reflection must address the issue of why and how teachers think as they do, rather than how and why they do not think as an educational "expert" thinks they "ought".

Second, there must be an acknowledgement that much of teacher reflection is, of necessity, manifestly concrete. An exploration of what reflection on the "technical" really looks like, especially whether it is ever only "means-end" oriented, and whether contradictions are apparent, is crucial here. Recent writings in feminist studies (e.g. Belenky, et al., 1986; de Lauretis, 1986; Gilligan, 1982; Martin and Mohanti, 1986; Pratt, 1984) can provide a useful lens for understanding this aspect of what is, especially at the elementary level "women's work" (Apple, 1986).

The third issue has to do with values: many of the criteria a teacher uses in making moral and ethical decisions may not be of a nature recognized within current "critical theory" frameworks. Justice and equality may, for instance, be less salient than caring or nurturing (Noddings, 1984), or may need redefinition.

Fourth, there is another dimension to judgments of worth. "Technical" skills, those of creating experiences for children that are both meaningful and satisfying, are not merely valuable, they are essential to getting things done, and they embody ethical deliberations. Whatever system evolves for understanding teachers' reflections, it must not, explicitly or implicitly, denigrate those skills. Rather, it should build from these, allowing for a more "connected" critique, one that leads from practice, through critical reflection, but always back to practice in a continuing dialectic. One must know how to, not just what and why. This is a version of the "technical", but one that assumes a close relationship between all three kinds of decisions. Rather than "levels", it may be better to think about these three as part of the same continuous, holistic activity.

The Place of Moral and Political Deliberation

There is a clear underlying idealist message in many conceptions of reflection: if the teacher thinks in this reflective way, then different (better) action will result. The question of the activity as represented in the terminology needs to be considered. The use of "reflection" as a noun or even "reflective" as an adjective undercuts, to some extent, the emphasis on thinking as active and political, removing a sense of agency. The nominalization and adjectivization succeed
in deflecting attention from who is doing the act - reflecting - at the time. As well, this usage focuses on reflecting as the end in itself rather than as a means to developing more ethical judgments and strategic action towards ethically important ends.

Liston and Zeichner (1987b) endeavor to fill this gap in the literature and theoretical development of reflective teaching when they discuss the importance of articulating and emphasizing moral deliberation in pre-service education. Their most recent work, however, still posits choice as the basis of proper (moral) reflection. Grant and Zeichner (1984) also emphasized the importance of choice: a student can choose whether to be a reflective or non-reflective teacher (p.4). That is, an individual decision can be made whether to "adopt" reflection as a form of thinking. Notwithstanding some reservations about the way rationality is used here as the basis for action, this position cannot explain a crucial question: If it is merely a matter of free, or guided, rational individual choice, why then, is "reflective teaching" so difficult to achieve? The very existence of the term and the practices associated with its promotion requires there to be an assumption that reflective teaching does not already occur or does not occur naturally. There is also an assumption that it can be taught. It may well be correct to assume that student teachers in particular are relatively apolitical and interested in becoming a "successful" teacher in terms of the norms presented by the dominant tradition in schools (See Hursh, 1988). Yet the concept as developed posits a different relationship between theory and practice than the idealist one and thus may undercut its own message through its form.

In Dewey's early use of the term "reflective action", and in the students' earlier cited understanding, there is a clear and particular linkage between theory and practice. The link of action and reflection, while echoed in the term "reflective teaching", tends to be ignored in the theoretical exposition of the nature of reflection. Reflection in the modern literature, even that which may call on Dewey himself, tends to appear more as a cerebral rather than a practical or material activity.

Schon's notion of "reflection-in-action" (1983) seems to address some of these problems. Yet while Schon's practitioners are situated within a social, economic, and political context, the values behind this context go unchallenged. Treating the context as static denies the possibility for action within the larger context, and confines the practitioner to technical tinkering. Another area needing attention is the tendency for "reflection" to be seen or used as a skill to be learned and acquired individually. If reflection is only a skill, however "artistic" (See, for example, Schon, 1983, 1987), then the political edge and the autonomy which it is hoped teachers will achieve as a result of practicing it are aspirations too ambitious for achievement. If not a skill, then the way the term is explicated needs more radical alteration than has been done so far.

In this area, the work of Kemmis (1985) is especially useful. For him, "reflection is a political act, which either hastens or defers the realization of a more rational, just and fulfilling society" (p.140). He offers seven "points", which in many ways summarize our discussion thus far and extend it into the realm of recommendations for research:

1. Reflection is not a purely "internal", psychological process; it is action-oriented and historically embedded.
Individual and Group Reflection: A Big Gap in the Theory

A serious theoretical problem is posed by the lack of attention to group processes of reflection and action. How group reflection can occur and what it may be, are areas the literature tends to either ignore or assume without explication. It is important to see reflection relationally and structurally, since the role of reflection in critical, political change would seem of necessity to be group-oriented. To ignore this aspect of reflection undercuts any hope of long term alteration of the cultural, economic, and political situations in which teachers find themselves, within specific educational institutions and on the broader, society-wide scene. If reflection is explained as a matter of individual choice, occurring within the psyche of the individual, structural pressure for change, wider than the individual or group in the school or classroom, cannot be taken into account. Yet it is precisely this wider situation that the reflective teaching practice is intended to change. Being "non-reflective" is a widespread ideological reconstruction of material conditions, rather than a matter of "choice".

In attempting to construct an explanation of reflection that would account for both individual and group reflection, the work of Jurgen Habermas on his theory of communicative action would seem a useful starting point (Habermas, 1984, 1987). In this work, Habermas challenges the tradition of individual consciousness behind current reflective projects and insists that the individual can only be seen in relation to the group. Benhabib, however, shows that Habermas himself still retains some elements of this same tradition in the way he conceives of the subject (Benhabib, 1986a and b) and asks him to go also beyond the "philosophy of the subject". For the conception of reflection with which we are dealing, this point is essential, since it is on the different interpretations of the role of subject that many of the different usages of the term and its practice occur.

From Descartes to Husserl, from Feuerbach to Adorno, the philosophical tradition has offered two models of the self: either the thinking, cogitate self, or the active one appropriating and transforming nature. Either a lonely self cogitates upon a object or an active self shapes the world. At least since Hegel's revival of Aristotle, attempts have been made in the modern tradition to understand inter-subjectivity and the relation between selves as well. But the focus has been on consciousness, not on language-in-use" (Benhabib, 1986a 242).

In her argument, Benhabib draws on Habermas' insight that the "philosophy of
consciousness puts the cart before the horse: it attempts to ground socialization...on individuation, whereas individuation proceeds under conditions of sociation alone" (Benhabib, 1986b: 242-3). Habermas' model of communicative action, centered on the lifeworld, rescues the possibility of human plurality and is at once the means and the goal of an emancipatory project.

This position encourages a relational theory of the self which then allows for both contradictions within the self as well as disputes and disagreements between people - a position which fits recent developments in psychoanalysis and feminist theories, and pushes further much of moral philosophy and political theory. The contribution of Benhabib in relation to Habermas is that she makes it possible to understand the movement of moral discourse from the private domain to the public, interpersonal domain, bringing it into discussion and dispute, and therefore subject to group deliberation and action.

Reflection as a communal project requires this commitment to communicative action, to collaborative work, and to emancipation as the goal and means. Versions of reflection which emphasize or rely upon singular, individual definitions of action and reflection do not admit the possibility of significant alteration of the status quo. By encouraging plurality, Benhabib suggests that our embodied identity and the narrative history that constitutes our selfhood gives us each a perspective on the world, which can only be revealed in a community of interaction with others. Such community and commonality arise and develop between us not, as Marx thought, because we are thrust into objectively similar life-conditions. A common, shared perspective is one that we create insofar as in acting with others we discover our difference and identity, our distinctiveness from, and unity with, others. The emergence of such unity-in-difference comes through a process of self-transformation and collective action (Benhabib, 1986a: 348).

The role of socialization which is one of Habermas' three areas of concern (cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization; Habermas, 1984) is particularly important when we are dealing with teacher education, which must be viewed as a part of the socialization into and structural reproduction of teaching practices and schooling norms. Thus we also need to pay attention to the structural constraints in which such actors undertake their collective action and self-transformation. Part of the focus of becoming a "reflective actor", in Benhabib's terms, will include working with the dynamics of the tension between self and other, through the consideration of concrete options around which communicative action occurs. For Habermas, self-reflexivity "entails critical awareness of the contingent conditions which make one's own standpoint possible (context of genesis), and an awareness of whom and what the knowledge one produces serves in society (context of application)" (Benhabib, 1986b: 281). Thus, "[a]long with the break from the philosophy of consciousness, the meanings of "reflection" and "self-reflection" change. These no longer refer to the cognitive activities of a Cartesian ego or to the laboring activity of making a self, but to processes of communication between selves" (Benhabib, 1986b: 282).

The act of reflection is - or perhaps can be and ought to be - the opportunity for the intersection of self and self, of theory and practice, of theory and theory, of history and future. Reflective action is not just retrospective pondering but also includes preparation for future
action. Reflection is not just self-criticism but also an analysis of other factors - i.e. social criticism. Ideally, this is what the term and its associated practices in teacher education are calling on. The danger is, however, that precisely because reflection is directly concerned with affecting individual as well as group judgment, it has the potential to be an even more insidious form of socialization than other methods available either to the university or to the schools and the public media. Reflection as an approved and sanctioned (and assessed!) approach within a university's teacher education program can become a reified object rather than a dynamic dialectic within the individual and the group, and between theory and practice, judgment and past/future activity. By appearing to offer "choice", by encouraging moral deliberation, the techniques associated with reflection may come to represent the action of reflection. This may actually result in a more profound colonization of teachers' minds with reflective techniques substituting for sustained, critical activity.

What we have to ensure is that we avoid the trap of the detached, Cartesian, unitary self, the existence of which is posited on a separation of self and action, of self and others, and on coherence within the self. The challenge to the concept of the unitary subject has come from recent feminist work, literature of "minorities", and also the French psychoanalytic school following Lacan. However, as much of recent feminist work also shows, their alternative - the split, fragmentary subject - is not a good basis for undertaking political work or even making ethical judgments (Martin, 1982). Therefore, the challenge is to find the possibility of a version of coherence and identity that does not depend on either unitary or totally split subjects. Habermas' theoretical development of communicative action is an important step in this direction, because he integrally relates self and society. As Schweickart (1985) points out, the coherence of a conversation does not presuppose agreement but rather difference as the starting point; disagreement and contradiction are necessary elements of an ongoing conversation. It is these elements that we try to incorporate into our understanding of reflection. They also give us the basis for judging the particular position of different versions of reflective teaching.

**Toward an Alternative Model: The Dimensions of Reflection**

An alternative model for conceptualizing what can be called the "parameters of the problematic" in reflective thinking, will now be explained. We present this "model" as a way of resolving some of the problems we have identified in the current understandings of reflection. In so doing, we remain aware of the problems arising from a too literal application or translation of any "model". We do not see the relationship between the different elements as fixed. Rather, we are interested in elaborating the range of dimensions possible. First, the "dimensions" are laid out along with suggestions for "reflective inquiry" appropriate to them. Then, examples of how this model resolves some of the issues raised in the previous sections, will be discussed.

The "dimensions" of reflection ("planes" or "fields" are also useful concepts here) are not to be thought of as hierarchical "layers" or "levels", but rather as forming a multi-dimensional figure depicting the terrain of educational reality and, therefore, its discourse. One plane of the figure (most easily thought of as a cube, although obviously the named dimensions exceed three) is occupied by the participants in the social world, their material reality, and their actions. It will be called the "sensory dimension" because it includes all of those things one can perceive: people, artifacts, skills, other actions, knowledge that can be written down or otherwise seen, as
well as the participants themselves. Teachers, children, their parents and other family members, administrators, teacher educators, educational "experts", government officials, non-parental community members, etc. are all active members. The material culture at this level includes physical objects: desks, books, crayons, school buildings, police stations, tenements, farm fields, curriculum guides, labor contracts, filmstrips, bathrooms, staff rooms, etc. Included here, too, are skills, as they are observed in "classroom management", "human relations", "group dynamics", lesson planning, pedagogics, running a committee, etc. Observable practices, such as "ability" grouping, large group instruction, "individualized" education, etc. would also be considered here. Reflective inquiry, then, includes such things as examination of artifacts, observation, interview, self-critique, and dialogue.

The second dimension is one of ideals. Here the work of Kemmis (1985) and Grundy (1982) has been particularly helpful. Grundy used the distinctions of Aristotelian ethics to outline three "modes of action research": technical, practical, and emancipatory. These do correspond, somewhat to the "levels" of van Manen (1977), but there is less of a hierarchy, and more emphasis on moral thinking within the second mode. Unlike the technical mode which focuses on "skillful action" - "knowing-how" (techne) and "scientific action" - "knowing-that" (episteme), the emphasis of the practical mode is on "moral action" - "knowing-why" (phronesis). Grundy describes further:

Phronesis is the basis for the wine-taster's ability. Knowledge, judgment, and taste combine to produce a discernment that is more than a skill. I shall use the term "practical judgment" for phronesis but these shades of meaning should be borne in mind...

Practical judgment being a disposition toward "good" action rather than "correct" action possesses an aspect of moral consciousness that techne lacks (p. 26). This general notion of the "good" that should be seen to permeate this dimension of ideals. It can be understood as referring to concrete moral or ethical principles, such as caring, justice or equality, but also as an ideological dimension.

Kemmis (1985), in attempting to show the political nature of reflection, gives a useful definition of ideology:

Regarded as an object, ideology is the cultural and cognitive "residue" of values, attitudes, and beliefs which sustain a society economically, socially, and politically by reproducing our ideas of how we fit into the life of society and, in particular, by reproducing the social relations of production in society. More dialectically, ideology is created and sustained through definite patterns and practices of communication (language), decision-making (power), and production (work) which create expectations and sustain meanings for people as they relate to one another in the whole matrix of social life (p. 147).

While not fully accepting of this definition of ideology as separate object, it does add much to our understanding of such an "ideals" dimension. It contributes "values, attitudes, and beliefs" to the definition of "the good" or "moral-ethical principles" which focuses prospective teachers' inquiries to move between the study of actual practices in the classroom, "behavioral modification" or "ability" grouping, for example, and the examination of the underlying
assumptions that are connected to those practices. It also points us in the desired direction of seeing not only connections back to the "sensory dimension", but also to other dimensions. This might help to expose the "socially constructed" nature of reality and reveal relationships to the economic, cultural, and political structures of society as they interact along the dynamics of class, gender and race (Apple, 1982).

The first of these "other" dimensions, is best understood as historical-comparative. The nature of the level itself requires little explanation. Reflective inquiry here could be directed at understanding how particular educational practices - classroom management, for example, came to be developed, or toward an exploration of the role of one's personal autobiography in the forming of educational beliefs or practices. It could be comparative, in the international sense, through a study of practices or beliefs in other countries; or it could involve comparisons between classrooms in different schools serving children from different social classes; or between educational beliefs held by various teachers; or even the contradictory impulses within the self.

The final dimension, that of "determinants", forms the face of the model's "cube" opposite to the sensory dimension. It is based on Apple's (1982) analysis, and is intended to depict the structures of the cultural, political, and economics spheres, as they intersect with class, gender, and race dynamics. Reflective inquiry involving this dimension could, for example, be the analysis of textbooks for racial, gender, or class bias. It could also be directed to the role of the state in curriculum development, or at the impact of the testing industry on classroom practices. It could focus our attention on the gendered composition of the teaching force as a function of time and economic conditions, or on the unintended impact of pedagogical practices on various cultural groups.

The model, then, can be represented as a cube, with two focusing "faces", the "sensory" and "determinants" dimensions, connected by the "ideals-ideology" and the "historical-comparative" dimensions (See Appendix). Reflectivity might be judged in terms of area or volume considered, with several, non-hierarchical points of entry. There is, however, no intended "more is better" measurement of such reflections, except in the sense that understanding and action in relation to all dimensions should be a goal for all concerned with education.

An analysis of how reflection actually occurred in a student teacher's work will help to clarify how this model resolves some of the previously raised issues. The student's project began with a general interest in classroom discussion, in part formed by a series of observations she made: the children had bored faces, most didn't talk, and their answers seemed to be short and factual. To her, her current teaching strategies did not seem to "work", according to some, as yet not fully articulated goal of greater "involvement" and more "complex" thoughts. She decided to gather more specific information, asking: What kinds of questions do I ask? Who do I call on?

Within the sensory plane, the "actors" took on new depth as the student teacher began to investigate her questions. There was differentiation among the groups, looking both at individuals and for patterns by race, gender, and class, as she asks: Who are they? There is an autobiographical search, as this exploration stirs memories of her own childhood experiences, i.e. she locates her own history in herself as an actor among other actors. Both the "determinants"
and the "historical/comparative" dimensions have been entered. The "actions", too, are
differentiated - who she calls on and the kinds of questions asked were seen to be a function of
the subject studied, the "materials" used in the activity and the nature of the students. New
questions arose, for example, Does my use of abstract terms instead of concrete objects in math
classes affect some children differently than others? Does my use of large group, rather than
small group organization influence discussion? This led to questions of "ideals": Why do I want
everyone involved? What am I assuming about the value of participation?

This student's reflections involved thoughts and actions and entered all of the
"dimensions". They gave her the ability to see actors in more depth and the realm of actions as
broader. Yet always these were situated in a larger context. Two other aspects were important
here. First, the different dimensions were continually connected and reconnected to reflections
in the "sensory plane". Each time there was an expansions not only of her awareness of the
action, actors, and materials, but of the relationship between these and other "dimensions". Second, a part of this "reflection" occurred with others. Her supervisor, her cooperating teacher,
the other students, and the children discussed what she was doing, offering insights that also
came from all dimensions. Reflection was thus a dynamic, multi-dimensional, and social activity.
It was not a linear process but a relational one.

Some Concluding and Initiating Thoughts

Some of the possible meanings which could be surfaced from the reflective teaching
literature include:

-the administrative approach, where one is involved in checking off whether certain things have
been achieved or completed, according to some accepted criteria, often imposed or
predetermined;
-the Cartesian approach, whereby the participant detaches her/himself (or the supervisor
assumes a detached position) in order to take a more "objective" stance towards actions and
thoughts;
-the Marxist view of eliminating false consciousness or the neo-Marxist position of reflection as
ideology-critique.

Only the last has been elaborated in terms of its higher level theory. Yet reflective
teaching literature within the broad Marxist tradition is also prone to assuming a unitary subject
as reflector. Like most of those promoting the practice of reflection, there is little attempt on
their part to be reflexive about the theory of reflection around which they work.

While we do not expect a nice, neat theoretical position clearly outlined in all writing about
reflection, we find it odd that those who promulgate it so rarely reflect on their theories of
reflection. This tendency continues a particular split between theory and practice - a split many
reflective teaching proponents are at pains to dispel among student teachers and teachers.

In this paper, we have indicated some areas of concern with current treatment of
reflective teaching. Perhaps the most important lesson for those of us in teacher education is to
recognize that the issue of "reflection" has been at the heart of much debate in many fields,
especially philosophy, for the last two hundred years. It is thus not surprising that there is debate and theoretical difficulty in our endeavors to alter prevalent conceptions.

We have to remind ourselves that reflection has a long history: it is part of how we define ourselves as human in the western world. The debate among practitioners and promoters of reflective teaching does not have to occur at these high levels of abstraction. However, to act as if these issues were newly discovered in the 1980s only in education, would be to miss the opportunity for dialogue with those in related fields and to underestimate and restrict the dimensions of reflection that are possible in teacher education. We need to remember that reflective action is both a practical and a theoretical activity - not merely a recent discovery in teacher education. Engaging in self-conscious dialogue, rather than didactics, may advance the causes of both the theory and practice of teacher education.

Much further research is needed in three areas. First, we need a better understanding of who the "reflector" is. The "knowing, independent thinker" is not an adequate description of the "subject". If the duality of reflection and practice is to be removed, historical and structural dimensions will have to be brought together with a reconstructed version of the subject. This will allow for a more substantial challenge to the ideology of the individual. The "reflective teaching" literature, while opposing certain forms of dualism, has itself been trapped in duality. The issue is not to create a bridge between theory and practice, form and content, reflection and action. Rather, the conceptualization of reflective teaching needs to incorporate both "moments" into a congruent dynamic of reflective action.

Secondly, and relatedly, a methodology needs to be developed that is not based only on individual, functionalist psychology. Rather, we need to understand what happens when people reflect, going beyond the personal to include the institutional and ideological. Such a methodology would carry with it the potential to contribute to social, rather than only psychological theory.

Finally, if a new conceptualization of the reflecting subject were brought together with an explanation of the act of reflection which goes beyond the psychological, then it would be possible to describe how reflection is both an individual and a social process. "[R]eflection is to be understood not as an abstracting away from a given content, but as an ability to communicate and to engage in dialogue." (Benhabib, 1986b: 333-4). For those of us engaged in promoting reflective teaching, further dialogue to reflect on this practice might elaborate some of the issues described above, as well as surfacing new issues about reflection in action.
References


Notes

1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, April, 1988. The present paper benefited from the thoughtful and caring comments of Michael Apple and Fazal Rizvi.

Authors’ Details

*Susan Noffke* is an associate professor at the department of Curriculum and Instruction in the University of Illinois. She has done historical/conceptual work in social studies as well as some analysis of her own practice as a social studies teacher educator, both of these with a particular eye toward issues of anti-racist education.

**Marie Brennan** is the Dean of Education and Head of School at the University of South Australia. Prior to this appointment in 2002, her previous academic jobs were at the University of Canberra, Central Queensland University and Deakin Universities. Her research interests include policy, education reform, student participation and action research.
Appendix: The Dimensions of Reflection
POSTSCRIPT
The Dimensions of Reflection: A Conceptual and Contextual Analysis

Susan E. Noffke  University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

When one of the editors of this journal asked me to contribute a piece, I was very happy - but also wondering what I’d send in. Luckily, the editor in question was also interested in “reflection” and there was an old paper not published elsewhere, which seemed to have some ideas useful to his own research agenda, partly around issues of “reflection”. Little did I know that this process of retrieving the paper, now 17 years old, would also retrieve memories of the whole process of learning to do academic writing, of becoming a professor, (including thoughts on why the paper has not until this time been published}, and of how one of the strongest relationships in my life began to be constructed.

Revisiting this article after so many years seems strange. But the editor assures me that my comments might be useful, and my appraisal of the current “reflective teaching” literature affirms that what we said then as graduate students is still relevant today. The latter issue will remain with the readers (I’ve made only minor modifications to reflect a few if the helpful comments we received so long ago, as well as just to locate to article as solely in reference to the 1980s literature). What I want to focus on here is partly an exploration as to why the paper stayed as an “unpublished” conference paper for so long. The quality of the paper is not an issue I address. That might be a logical question, but my concern is rather with our journey with this paper. My thoughts are about context and structures rather than about the merits of the arguments themselves.

My dear colleague, co-author, and friend, Marie Brennan, and I did the work many years ago while we were graduate students together. We wrote the paper together, after doing individual papers as part of a 1988 AERA symposium on reflection. It was one of the first of many pieces of our relationship that have emerged continuously since that time from our shared commitments to action research, to collaboration between schools, universities, and communities, and to each other. I had not thought about that paper in quite some time. I’d even forgotten that we submitted it to a journal, and as I look at them now, received 2 out of 3 positive reviews with very useful suggestions (the third one really “trashed” our work) and there was a very encouraging letter from the editor encouraging us to make the revisions and resubmit the paper. That was in December of 1988. When I looked further in the file, there was also a follow-up letter from the editor from November of 1989, still interested in the paper, wondering if we were going to send it in again. There was also a copy of the paper, literally full of comments and suggestions from my then mentor and colleague, Catherine Cornbleth. As I look at the latter today, I am really conscious of how much I learned from her careful attention, even if we never revised the paper.

So why didn’t we follow up on this opportunity for a “refereed journal article”, already half “in the bag”. Some of it is related to material conditions. I was not present at the 1988 AERA as my husband and I were awaiting our daughter, who arrived on June 1 of that year (and later referred to Marie as her “other Mommy”), the last year of our graduate study. In the summer of 1989, we both left UW-Madison. Marie had defended her dissertation (with some
revisions to do) and returned to her position in the Ministry of Education in Melbourne. I still had almost half the dissertation left to write, but was taking up a position at SUNY-Buffalo. The children (aged almost 9 and almost 1 ½) came with me. My husband stayed in his position in Madison, coming once a month for about a week. (The “commuting” continued for almost 3 years). Needless to say, both of us were pretty busy with things other than this article (We did both eventually complete our degrees, of course). While others under similar circumstances might have completed the submission, I/we did not.

Beyond issues of material conditions, though, the process of “non-publishing” also seems to me to be an example of how we as academics live some of the very concepts we seek to explore. Both of us spent our years of graduate school immersed in concepts like “habitus” and “cultural capital”, “intensification of labor”, not to mention addressing aspects of “gender”. Ironically, all of these clearly played roles in the “story” of this paper, as well. (Here, I want to remind readers, that this is Sue speaking. Marie may not agree.). The obvious ones have to do with understanding “how things work” in the academy. I had a wonderful group of supportive colleagues in Buffalo, ones who really helped me to understand that “Revise and resubmit” meant that you had your foot in the door, and also showed me how to address reviewers concerns (not always to comply, but to respond). I was able to use this in getting the second article I submitted accepted, but went on to other projects and didn’t get back to the reflection piece.

In some ways, I was really lucky. I came into the academy just as “the bar” was being raised; having done major conference presentations and having a book chapter in the works sufficed for getting a job. For many graduates now, a “publication record” is often required before a position can be secured, although it seems to me to be antithetical to having time to really find the connections (intellectual and material) to develop depth of both research and its ethical and political implications. And what of gender? I’ve struggled with that one since the 1960s (Marie and I recently did a book chapter on our relationship with the term, “feminist”, Noffke & Brennan, 2004). All of the “isms” are alive and well in the academy and do influence our career trajectories, not to mention our personal well-being. But perhaps such categories also propel us in our work. For me (perhaps) it was the work I did in those early years in Buffalo, thinking about collaborative work with teachers (women) in terms of feminist ethics and epistemology, which took me away from the earlier work. Who knows? But I also think that this part of who I am has propelled me most strongly into thinking about issues of race.

And still we are not reducible to any of these material conditions or fully explained by any social theory. I am still me, responsible (procrastinating, reading slowly, avoiding writing, being an activist-researcher not always in “good” balance, still not understanding how to be a professor…) for my own “productivity issues”. Despite the relentless efforts of some misogynists, and with the steadfast support of some really great folks (husband and friends), I am still “here”. “Agency” wins? I don’t know on either a theoretical or practical level, but I do know that I want to be there with Gramsci and R. Williams as part of “optimism of the will”, and “politics of hope” crowd.

Revisiting this paper also evokes the relationship that crafted it. When I pulled out the folder, there were the two individual papers each of us did, as well as lots of handwritten notes
from both of us. Our relationship, still strong and yet different after all of these years, was built out of all of those bits and pieces of work together – intellectual work, yes, but also of building an enduring friendship through sharing much of our lives, personal and political. We have written (and published) many works together in the intervening years, each one seems to me almost like a marker of a new turn in our lives and relationships. I do hope that “young” scholars work to create such relationships, across distance, difference, and the many barriers that the “university community of scholars as structured by capitalism continues to erect.

I hope that people find this “postscript” useful, and/or the paper. I also hope that other grad students/young faculty will not take so long to get their ideas “in print”, but may they also continue to believe in themselves and the political agendas they foster through their scholarship.

-Sue

Miscellany

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